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4 Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny 
 
Summary 
While the energy market has served us well for many years, it is clear that the current 
arrangements are unlikely to deliver the level of investment that is needed to meet our 
energy security and climate change objectives. The Government’s proposed Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR) therefore has a crucial role to play in securing a clean and reliable 
electricity system for the future, at the minimum cost to consumers. The pre-legislative 
scrutiny process has identified some serious concerns with the proposals as they currently 
stand, which could make the reforms unworkable if they are not resolved. But the perfect 
should not be the enemy of the good and we believe that it is difficult but possible for the 
Government to revise the plans into a workable model. 
DECC’s stated objectives for reforming the electricity market (to move to a secure, more 
efficient, low-carbon energy system in a cost-effective way) are uncontentious but vacuous; 
very few people would seriously object to these aims. However, the lack of specific 
outcomes means that there is still uncertainty about exactly what the Government is hoping 
to achieve through these reforms. The Bill would benefit from the inclusion of a set of 
much clearer and more specific objectives. In particular, providing greater clarity about the 
role that the electricity sector is expected to play in contributing towards the UK’s long-
term decarbonisation target would help to boost confidence amongst the investment 
community. We believe that an explicit reference to the carbon budgets in the Bill, as well 
as making the Committee on Climate Change a statutory consultee on the delivery plan, 
would help to create greater certainty about the UK’s commitment to meeting its statutory 
obligations. 
As with many aspects of energy policy, the Government has fallen into the trap of focusing 
far too closely on the supply side of the energy system, while neglecting to consider the 
contribution that demand-side activities could make to security and climate change 
objectives. Thinking about the demand-side needs to be given a much higher priority in 
the Bill, not least because it is likely to deliver much more cost effective solutions than 
building ever greater levels of generating capacity. 
At the heart of the reforms is the proposal to establish a Feed-in Tariff with a Contract for 
Difference (CfD). There is a great deal of merit in the idea of CfDs—most notably the 
principle of revenue certainty provided by a long-term contract—but the implementing 
arrangements have become so complex that the proposal has now arguably become 
unworkable. 
There are three major problems with the CfD model that is currently proposed by DECC. 
First, the payment model based on a “synthetic” counterparty is not bankable because there 
is genuine uncertainty about whether any contracts would be legally enforceable. Second, 
the impact of “rationing” CfDs under the Treasury’s levy cap will be to increase 
development risk, possibly to the point that the project pipeline could dry up. Finally, the 
removal of an obligation to buy renewable energy could compromise the ability of 
independent generators to take part in the market, which could lead to fewer players and 
greater levels of vertical integration. Indeed, the Bill and associated documents do not give 
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sufficient consideration to the risk of negative impacts on smaller scale players in general.
Although these are significant concerns, we believe that it is still possible to make the 
proposals work. We recommend that the Government abandons the multiparty concept 
and reverts to a single counterparty model. We believe a single counterparty that is 
underwritten by the Government would be the best way to reduce the cost of capital, but if 
the Government does go ahead with a model that is not underwritten by the Government, 
it must specifically assess the effect of this decision in a new impact assessment. In addition, 
we believe that there may be merit in the two-step registration process for allocating CfDs 
that has been proposed in some quarters, as it appears to strike a balance between awarding 
a contract to anyone and everyone (possibly resulting in under delivery) and waiting so late 
in the development process that the risk of not getting a CfD becomes unacceptably high. 
Finally, we recommend that the eligibility threshold for small-scale Feed-in Tariffs should 
be extended to at least 10MW in order to allow smaller scale generators and community-
owned schemes to continue to operate. We also suggest that DECC should consider 
options such as introducing a buyer of last resort or introducing an incentive to source 
energy from low-carbon generation to ensure that there is access to market for larger scale 
projects from independent generators. 
A further problem with the CfD proposal relates to the treatment of nuclear power. The 
proposed process for agreeing the strike price for nuclear lacks transparency (both under 
the Investment Instruments process and CfDs when they are introduced) and any 
perception that decisions are being made “behind closed doors” could be hugely damaging 
to the low-carbon agenda. In order to help preserve confidence and trust in the process, a 
committee of independent experts should be appointed to oversee the negotiation process. 
The Government is right to identify that there may be a risk to security of supply if 
investment in new capacity does not come forward to replace the existing generating plant 
that is scheduled to close down towards the end of this decade. It is unfortunate, therefore, 
that talk of the possibility of a capacity mechanism appears to be having the unintended 
consequence of freezing new investment. As a matter of urgency, more clarity is needed 
about the circumstances in which a capacity mechanism would be introduced. In addition 
Government must carry out a more rigorous analysis of the problem that the capacity 
mechanism is intended to address, with a specific consideration of the likely impact of 
integrating a large volume of intermittent generation on to the system. 
The Emissions Performance Standard as currently proposed would be at best pointless. At 
worst, the decision to grandfather the initial level until 2045 may undermine our ability to 
meet long-term carbon targets and so the length of the grandfathering period should be 
reduced. 
We do not believe that it is appropriate for a private company (National Grid) to act as the 
EMR delivery body and fear that this decision may lead to unnecessary additional costs to 
consumers. 
The importance of ensuring a timely delivery of electricity market reform cannot be 
overstated: reform is vital if we are to meet low-carbon and energy security aspirations for 
2020. It is therefore vital that DECC’s timetable does not slip. We do not underestimate the 
scale of the challenge that the Government is facing in preparing a Bill that is fit for 
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purpose in time for introduction in the autumn but every endeavour must be made to 
avoid further delays to the process. 
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1 Introduction 
1. The Government’s vision is to move to a secure, low-carbon energy system in a cost 
effective way. Achieving this goal will be no mean feat. Around a fifth of our existing 
generating capacity is scheduled to close in the next decade and there are also challenging 
climate change and renewable energy targets for 2020. DECC has estimated that up to £110 
billion of investment for new electricity generation and transmission infrastructure is likely 
to be needed by 2020, which will require the current rate of investment to more than 
double.  
2. At a time when both company and government balance sheets are stretched, and other 
faster growing economies are also seeking substantial investment in energy infrastructure, 
securing this level of investment represents an enormous challenge. What is more, rising 
gas prices and growing levels of fuel poverty have pushed questions of affordability to the 
fore. It will therefore be vital that, as we move towards a new energy system, every effort is 
made to maximise value for money and minimise costs to consumers. 
3. Many witnesses argued that the framework in which the market currently operates will 
not deliver the necessary levels of investment (although some argued that the existing 
Renewables Obligation would be sufficient to deliver investment in renewable energy). 
There is clearly a problem in attracting investment at the moment. We have already fallen 
behind schedule, with only a third of the annual investment required in wind having been 
delivered and the prospects for new nuclear looking increasingly uncertain.1  
4.  As a result, DECC has been working to develop a new framework that it hopes will 
provide the necessary incentives to secure investment. One of the main goals of this work 
has been to reduce the risks associated with investments in low-carbon generation, thereby 
making them more attractive to prospective investors. 
5. The Government’s initial proposals were published for consultation in December 2010.2 
We conducted an inquiry on these proposals and reported in May 2011.3 DECC 
subsequently published a White Paper in July 2011 and a technical update in December 
2011.4 We heard evidence on the technical update in January 2012.5 
The pre-legislative scrutiny process 
6. We indicated our willingness to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny to the Department in 
January this year, but made clear at the time that this should not be at the expense of an 
early introduction of the Bill.6 The draft Bill was not published until 22 May 2012. We 
 
1 Committee on Climate Change, Meeting Carbon Budgets – 2012 Progress Report to Parliament, June 2012 
2 DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document, Cm 7983, December 2012 
3 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12, Electricity Market Reform, HC 742 
4 DECC, Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity, CM 8099, July 
2011; DECC, Planning our electric future: technical update, December 2011 
5 Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee on 24 and 25 January 2012, HC (2010-12) 
1781-i and 1781-ii 
6 Ev 107 (letter dated 31 January 2012) 
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support the Government’s overall objectives for the electricity sector and see electricity 
market reform as vital to achieving these aims. We were therefore willing to take part in 
this process and have done so in the spirit of making a constructive contribution towards 
the Bill. We hope that the result will be better, more workable and more effective 
legislation. 
7. However, our efforts to provide robust and effective scrutiny have been hampered by a 
number of factors. First, the timescale in which we have been asked to conduct and 
conclude our inquiry—just five sitting weeks—has made examination of what is a very 
complex set of proposals extremely challenging. This timescale is well below the 12 sitting 
weeks that a Joint Committee conducting a similar task would, by convention, be granted.7 
8. Second, we have been dismayed by the lack of detail provided on key aspects of the 
proposals, most notably on the crucial question of who will be the counterparty for the new 
Contracts for Difference. In addition, DECC was still collecting evidence as we carried out 
our inquiry in many vital areas (for example, demand reduction, the Power Purchase 
Agreement market and detailed design of the capacity market, to name but three). It is very 
difficult for us to comment constructively on these aspects without having had access to 
this evidence base.  
Role of the Treasury 
9. Finally, the refusal of the Treasury to provide a witness or to answer our questions in 
writing has seriously undermined the pre-legislative scrutiny process.8 Treasury Ministers 
have given evidence to this Committee on several previous occasions and we are aware of 
at least one example of a Treasury Minister giving evidence to a Public Bill Committee on a 
Bill where it was not the departmental lead.9 We are therefore frankly astonished by the 
suggestion that providing evidence to the Committee would “establish a precedent” that 
would “undermine” its “role in Government as spending arbiter” (in the past the 
Treasury’s approach has been more pragmatic, demonstrating an acceptance that, even 
within the parameters of joined-up government, there is scope for discussion and scrutiny 
of interaction between Treasury policy and that of other government departments). 10 
10. Numerous witnesses told us that Treasury policy (and in particular the levy control 
framework) was having a direct impact on energy investment decisions. What is more, the 
levy cap may, paradoxically, result in increased costs to consumers and may damage 
prospects for growth in low-carbon industries - exactly the outcomes the Treasury is 
seeking to avoid. These are important questions that must be addressed, but the Treasury’s 
apparent refusal to engage with the possibility that its policies may have unintended 
consequences risks derailing DECC’s proposals and producing a worse deal for consumers. 
All Government departments must explicitly support a policy framework that is evidence-
based. 
 
7 Ev 107 (letter dated 24 May 2012) 
8 Ev 111, Ev 115  
9 Child Poverty Bill, Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2009 
10 Oral evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee on 4 May 2011, HC (2010-12) 1018-i; Oral 
evidence taken before the Energy and Climate Change Committee on 1 December 2011, HC (2010-12)1605 Ev 111 
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11. The draft Bill is a framework Bill, with much of the detail to be contained in secondary 
legislation. One witness argued that the Committee should undertake further scrutiny of 
these proposals, when the final models are available.11 Since much of this detail is essential 
to understanding whether the reforms are likely to be effective, we have not limited our 
inquiry to the draft Bill itself, but have also explored some of the broader policy questions 
relating to the proposed reforms. 
12. We received 79 submissions of written evidence and held five oral evidence sessions. 
We also held a roundtable discussion with investors and financial analysts. A note of the 
meeting, along with a full list of witnesses can be found at the end of this report.12 We are 
very grateful to all those who contributed evidence to this inquiry. We would like to 
express particular thanks to Dr Robert Gross (Imperial College) and Professor Derek Bunn 
(London Business School) who were Specialist Advisers to the inquiry.13 
Suggestions that the Bill be scrapped 
13. The Government’s original proposals for electricity market reform were based on four 
key measures: a Feed-in Tariff for low-carbon energy, a Carbon Price Floor, an Emissions 
Performance Standard and a Capacity Mechanism.14 The Carbon Price Floor has already 
been legislated for through the Finance Act 2011, so the draft Energy Bill focuses on the 
remaining three measures. 
14. As we noted in our previous report on this subject, “Electricity Market Reform” is really 
a misnomer, since the proposals will not actually change the current British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) system under which electricity is 
traded in the electricity market. Instead, they will “bolt on” additional market mechanisms, 
taxes and regulatory measures.15 As noted below, aspects of wholesale market reform 
appear critical to EMR (para 125). We were therefore not surprised by the lack of proposals 
to make changes to the wholesale market itself in the draft Bill. 
15. Many witnesses believed that there was a need for reform of some kind (although it was 
widely known that the starting point would not be radical market reform). However, many 
also felt that the proposals as currently constructed would not deliver increased investment 
in low-carbon generation.16 As the Low Carbon Finance Group put it, the proposals “at 
present, do not form a framework or structure that financiers believe they could present to, 
and secure approval from, credit or investment committees”.17  
 
11 Ev w54 
12 See Annex 1 
13 Relevant interests can be found at www.parliament.uk/ecc 
14 DECC, Electricity Market Reform Consultation Document, Cm 7983, December 2010 
15 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Electricity Market Reform para 60 
16 Ev 117, Ev 123, Ev 127, Ev w34, Ev 151, Ev w79, Ev w89, Ev w101, Ev 178, Ev w115, Ev 211, Ev 221, Ev w154, Ev w161, 
Ev w167, Q 46 [Mr McElroy], Q 96 [Mr Skillings], Q 97 [Prof Mitchell], Q 142 [Ms Hartnell, Mr Gardiner, Mr Kingsbury, 
Mr Temperton and Dr Edge], Q 188 [Mr MacDougall and Mr Rehmanwala], Q 231 [Mr Steedman and Ms Kelly] 
17 Ev 211 
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16. Some witnesses argued that the proposals were fundamentally flawed and that the 
whole EMR process should be stopped.18 However, others thought that it was still possible 
to revise the proposals and to create a workable framework.19 While we are certain that 
significant changes are needed to the draft Bill, we also recognise that scrapping the plans 
at this stage would lead to even greater uncertainty, further delays in securing much needed 
new investment, and would undermine the credibility of UK energy policy. It would also 
seriously jeopardise the prospects for meeting our 2020 renewable energy and climate 
change targets and could even threaten energy security. It is therefore our intention in this 
report to engage constructively with the proposals that are on the table, rather than 
suggesting DECC rips up the Bill and starts again; the perfect should not become the 
enemy of the good. We aim to highlight the areas where DECC needs to carry out further 
work before introducing its Bill and, where possible, to make practical recommendations 
for how the draft Bill could be improved. 
17. As well as Electricity Market Reform, the draft Bill also covers a number of other 
subjects (Energy Strategy and Policy Statement, the Office of Nuclear Regulation, Offshore 
Transmission and Government Pipeline and Storage System). Owing to the time 
constraints in which we have conducted this inquiry, we have not been able to include the 
detail of these other, less controversial areas in our scrutiny. 
Structure of this report 
18. Our report relates to the Chapters of the draft Bill as follows: 
• draft Bill Chapter 1, Contracts for Difference – Chapter 3 of this report 
• draft Bill Chapter 2, Investment Instruments – Chapter 4 
• draft Bill Chapter 3, Capacity Market – Chapter 5 
• draft Bill Chapter 4, Conflicts of interest – Chapter 6 
• draft Bill Chapters 5, Contingency Arrangements and 6, The Renewables Obligation: 
Transitional Arrangements – we have not examined these chapters in great detail. 
• draft Bill Chapter 7, Emissions Performance Standard – Chapter 7 of this report 
19. As described above, we have focused our inquiry on Part 1 of the Bill and we have 
not looked at Parts 2 – 4 in great detail.   
 
18 Ev 221, Ev w3 
19 Ev 117,Ev 155, Ev 161, Ev w61, Ev 176, Q 2 [Mr Anderson], Q 46 [Mr de Rivaz], Q 97 [Dr Kennedy], Q 98 [Mr Skillings], 
Q 188 [Mr Taylor], Q 240 [Ms Kelly] 
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2 Omissions and unintended 
consequences from the draft Bill  
20. In this section we provide an overview of key aspects that are missing from the draft 
Bill as well as a number of potential unintended outcomes from the proposals. The details 
behind each of these aspects are provided in subsequent chapters. 
A lack of detail: a framework Bill 
21. The draft Bill contains 50 individual provisions for delegated powers.20 A substantial 
amount of detail relating to the basic design of the Contracts for Difference (CfD) and 
Capacity Market will be contained in secondary legislation that is not available for scrutiny 
at this time. This includes important terms of CfDs that are key to their operation, such as 
the length of contract, any penalties payable (for not completing projects on time), and the 
setting of two key prices that will determine payments under CfDs (the “strike price” and 
“market reference price”). We consider that these are more than technical details because 
they are of direct and immediate interest to developers and investors.  
22. In some areas the draft Bill provides for limited (negative procedure), or even no 
Parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation. The absence of detail raised concern 
among many witnesses, who stressed that they could not have confidence in the outcomes 
until they had seen the detailed workings for these mechanisms.21 DECC’s Delegated 
Powers Memorandum says (in respect of CfDs): 
The key elements and principles of the CFD scheme are set out on the face of the 
draft Bill...[and associated documents]... Further detailed work will be undertaken to 
give effect to these provisions, and elements of the mechanism such as targets and 
support levels will need to be updated periodically over the lifetime of the 
mechanism. Therefore, the Department considers that it is appropriate to address 
the detailed design of the scheme in secondary legislation.22 
23. Some witnesses perceived increased risk that future Secretaries of State would be able to 
amend the framework “with relatively low levels of Parliamentary scrutiny (because 
amendments will be subject to negative resolution procedure)”.23 
24. In the context of the challenging timescale we have been set for this inquiry, we have 
focussed on the policy objectives of the Bill. However, we note that the success of the EMR 
will lie in the detail. Since the basic design of CfDs and the Capacity Market will not be 
enshrined in primary legislation, the secondary legislation will be more than just technical 
implementation and the opportunities for further Parliamentary scrutiny should be 
maximised.  
 
20 Ev w179 
21 Ev 130, Ev 137, Ev w86, Ev w148, Ev w167 
22 Ev w179 
23 Ev 168, Ev w74, Q 2 [Ms Vaughan] 
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25. We asked the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for 
its opinion on DECC’s Delegated Powers Memorandum. Unfortunately it was not able to 
offer a formal view in the time available, but we will await with interest its view on whether 
the parliamentary procedures in the Bill provide for sufficient scrutiny of the detail of the 
proposals. 
26. DECC has noted that elements of the detail embodied in secondary legislation such as 
generic CfD terms “are not intended to change substantially over time”. It should therefore 
be possible to make generic designs available to Parliament to assist its scrutiny during the 
passage of the real Bill. We recommend that in order to increase confidence and ensure 
that there is an opportunity for rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny, the Government 
should publish draft secondary legislation, including a model Contract for Difference, 
in time for formal consideration of the Bill. 
Clarity about the key goals of the Bill 
27. The introduction to the draft Bill highlights the Government’s ambition to move to a 
“secure, more efficient, low-carbon energy system in a cost-effective way”.24 It also 
reaffirms the Government’s commitment to meeting the UK’s legally binding emission 
reduction targets and 2020 renewables target.25 The Secretary of State confirmed the 
objectives of the draft Bill, telling us that: 
They are to get energy security, to keep the lights on; they are to decarbonise, to 
ensure we stop polluting; and they are to do that at the least cost, because 
affordability has to be a consideration.26 
28. Nevertheless, we heard from many witnesses that the objectives for the Bill were not 
sufficiently clear.27 We suggest that there are two reasons for this perception. First, the draft 
Bill does not specify the outcomes it is aiming to achieve: what level of reliability of supply 
is acceptable? What level of emissions would be considered “low-carbon”? How much is it 
reasonable for consumers to pay? Without providing a sense of what success looks like, 
stakeholders remain uncertain about what exactly the Government is hoping to achieve 
through these reforms.  
29. We note that despite the Secretary of State’s assertion that the objectives of the Bill 
were clear, they are not set out formally on the face of the Bill. 
30. The second aspect of uncertainty stems from contradictory signals about which of these 
objectives takes priority. For example, achieving security and decarbonisation “at least 
cost” suggests that decarbonisation and security goals have priority over reducing costs. 
But the existence of the Treasury’s levy control framework has created a perception that, in 
 
24 Draft Energy Bill, CM 8362, May 2012, Introduction, p 9, para 1 
25 Draft Energy Bill, CM 8362, May 2012, Introduction, p 9, para 2 
26 Q 383 
27 Ev 123, Ev 127, Ev 137, Ev w37, Ev 161, Ev 168, Ev w71, Ev 172, Ev 187, Q 122 [Dr Kennedy], Q 231 [Mr Benton] 
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practice, caps on consumer costs might trump carbon reduction.28 The Energy Technology 
Institute stated:  
The Bill and the accompanying documentation also does not clarify how the 
government will ensure coherence between its carbon budget, its published Carbon 
Plan, and its approach to delivering EMR. This, along with the closeness of the 
department to the delivery plan, may cause investors to perceive a significant risk 
that the EMR delivery plan and associated funding commitments will be subject to 
short-term spending review pressures.29  
31. We asked the Secretary of State to clarify whether the levy cap or climate change targets 
had primacy. He told us: 
We are not going to break the law […] ultimately we need to make sure we meet our 
legal obligations.30 
32. We welcome the Secretary of State’s clarification that if faced with a choice between 
meeting legal climate change obligations and sticking within the levy cap, the 
Government would give primacy to statutory climate obligations. The investment 
community would have been further reassured had HM Treasury been able to confirm 
this. Because HM Treasury have told us that DECC spoke for all of Government in its 
evidence, we consider this a cast iron commitment to the primacy of statutory 
obligations over the Levy Control Framework. We would welcome an explanation from 
HM Treasury about how the working of the levy cap over the forthcoming funding 
period will be amended to make it compatible with the requirement to meet legal 
climate change obligations. 
Improving clarity about decarbonisation 
33. The Committee on Climate Change has recommended that the carbon intensity of the 
power sector will need to fall to around 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 if we are to take the most 
cost effective route to meeting our 2050 decarbonisation objective.31 DECC adopted an 
“indicative target” of 100gCO2/kWh by 2030 as the basis for the modelling that 
underpinned the White Paper.32 However, the UK does not currently have any statutory 
targets relating to carbon emissions or the energy mix in 2030.33  
34. Air Products told us that “the perception is that UK policy is becoming more uncertain 
and more unpredictable, particularly concerning the future of renewable energy post-
2020”.34 Numerous witnesses told us that a specific carbon reduction target for the 
 
28 Q 21 [Mr Marchant, Ms Vaughn], Q 125 [Mr Skillings], Q 191 [Mr MacDougall] 
29 Ev w139  
30 Q 485 
31 Committee on Climate Change, The Fourth Carbon Budget: Reducing emissions through the 2020s, 7 December 2010 
32 DECC, Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity, CM 8099, July 
2011, para 7.25 
33 The UK has legally binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets for 2020 and 2050 and a renewable energy 
target for 2020. 
34 Ev w98 
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electricity sector on the face of the Bill would help to address this concern and would boost 
investor confidence in the UK’s commitment to decarbonisation.35 Green Alliance said: 
Without a specific carbon objective, it will be unclear to investors whether 
government will continue to issue a sufficient volume of CfDs for low carbon plant 
and force existing and future gas CCGT to operate as peaking plant or fit CCS, 
especially if the costs of low carbon generation are higher than anticipated.36 
35. Not everyone agreed that this was necessary and we heard that adding a carbon 
reduction target to the Bill would duplicate the existing targets in the Climate Change Act 
2008.37 However, the targets in the Act are not sector specific. Nick Molho (WWF) pointed 
out that the targets in the Act have not yet been sufficient to bring forward investment in 
the electricity sector so investors need more clarity about what is expected on a shorter 
timescale up to 2030.38 David Kennedy (Committee on Climate Change) told us: 
At the beginning of the Climate Change Act, we have, “This is about this is the long-
term target”. I think in this piece of legislation you write, “This is about 
decarbonising the power sector to achieve legally binding carbon budgets”, and then 
you put a process in place to make sure that the governance arrangements following 
the legislation achieve the objective.39 
36. He also highlighted the importance of linking to the Carbon Budget process: 
A fourth carbon budget, which we legislated for last summer, will be reviewed in 
2014, and a fifth carbon budget covering the period 2028 to 2032 will be set in 2015. 
So we will have all the debates around cost and affordability as we go through 
legislating for the fifth carbon budget. To join those up, and to make sure that the 
Levy Control Framework is adaptable to what is agreed in the context of carbon 
budgets, rather than the other way round—that we miss carbon budgets because it 
doesn’t have the support in the Levy Control Framework—is the right way forward.40 
37. It is right to prioritise the decarbonisation of the electricity system because this is 
likely to deliver the most cost effective route to meeting our 2050 climate change 
targets. Although statutory carbon reduction targets are set out in the Climate Change 
Act 2008, these are economy wide, rather than sector specific. We conclude that 
providing greater clarity about the contribution that the power sector is expected to 
make towards meeting these targets would help to provide certainty to investors. The 
Government should set a 2030 carbon intensity target for the electricity sector in 
secondary legislation based on the recommendation of the Committee on Climate 
Change. 
 
35 Ev 127, Ev w26, Ev 137, Ev w37, Ev 161, Ev w71, Ev 172, Ev 187, Ev w163, Q 119 [Dr Kennedy], Q 231 [Mr Steedman 
and Mr Benton] 
36 Ev 172 
37 Q 124 [Prof Newbery], Q 232 [Ms Kelly] 
38 Q 233 
39 Q 122 
40 Q125 
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38. We recommend that the Committee on Climate Change should be made a statutory 
consultee to the EMR delivery plan in order to assess whether the proposals are in line 
with legally binding carbon budgets. 
39. We further recommend that the Committee on Climate Change should be given a 
role in advising whoever is the Transmission System Operator in the development of 
the delivery plan to ensure that it is in line with legally binding carbon budgets. 
Improving clarity about minimising costs to consumers 
40.  While decarbonisation is a priority, it should not be delivered at any cost. Consumer 
Focus recommended amending Clause 1, subsection (1) of the draft Bill to introduce a 
focus on keeping costs down.41 The importance of minimising costs and protecting 
vulnerable consumers is also a high priority for the Committee and is addressed in 
paragraphs 117, 134, 136 and 172-175.  
Improving clarity about energy security 
41. Witnesses also recommended introducing a reliability standard in order to provide 
greater clarity about the security of supply objective. This point is addressed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
Proposed amendments to the draft Bill 
42. In this section we propose a number of amendments to the draft Bill to deliver the 
outcomes recommended in paragraphs 37, 38, 40 and 164. We do not have the benefit of 
Parliamentary Counsel advice on drafting but propose below what seems to be required. 
We request that the Government addresses the spirit of the amendments in its response 
and in the Bill it introduces in the autumn. We provide in Annex 2 a list of proposed 
amendments in conventional format for consideration during the Committee Stage of a 
Bill.42  
43. We recommend that Clause 1, subsection (1) of the Bill be amended to read “The 
Secretary of State may make regulations about contracts for difference for the purpose 
of encouraging low carbon electricity generation in order to achieve legally binding 
carbon budgets at least possible cost to consumers”. 
44. We recommend that Clause 8, subsection (2) be amended to add “[…] (d) a 2030 
target for carbon intensity of the electricity sector compatible with meeting statutory 
carbon budgets and the 2050 target (e) a reliability standard”. We believe that setting a 
decarbonisation target should be a duty on the Secretary of State. However, the current 
wording of Clause 8 (the Secretary of State “may” by order provide for […]) suggests 
that the introduction of “other targets” would be at the Secretary of State’s discretion. 
Therefore we recommend that the Bill be amended to make this a statutory obligation 
within a fixed timeframe, possibly by way of further amendment to Clause 8. We note 
 
41 Ev 123 
42 Annex 2 
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that a carbon intensity of the order of around 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 is compatible with 
legally binding carbon budgets. 
45. We recommend that Clause 9, subsection (1) be amended to add “[…] (e) the 
Committee on Climate Change […]” and that Clause 44, subsection (4) be amended to 
add “(d) the Committee on Climate Change”.  
46. We recommend that Clause 20, subsection (1) of the Bill be amended to read “The 
Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purpose of providing 
capacity to meet the demands of consumers for the supply of electricity in Great 
Britain, while achieving legally binding carbon budgets at least possible cost to 
consumers” 
47. We recommend that the long title should be amended to read “Make provision for 
contracts for difference and investment instruments in connection with encouraging 
low carbon electricity generation in order to achieve legally binding carbon budgets 
and provide security of supply at least cost to consumers […]”. We recommend that the 
long title should be further amended to delete “contracts for difference” and insert 
“support mechanisms”. 
Demand-side measures 
48. The predominant approach to meeting electricity policy goals (presented in the draft 
Bill and associated documents) is to focus on the supply side – to ensure sufficient power 
stations are available to meet demand. However, the demand-side can also contribute. By 
reducing the total demand for electricity, for example through improved energy efficiency, 
fewer power stations and power lines would be needed. By encouraging demand to become 
more flexible and responsive, it would be easier to accommodate low-carbon electricity 
from a combination of intermittent and inflexible power stations, such as wind and nuclear 
generators.43 Reducing demand, and facilitating the management and prioritisation of 
demand to ensure the lights stay on, would almost certainly provide a cheaper, easier and 
less polluting way to meet our electricity needs. 
49. We note that virtually the sole mention of the possibility of the inclusion of demand 
side measures in the Energy Bill is contained in a paragraph in the preamble to the Bill, 
which states that the Department is “currently reviewing the potential for incentivising 
further demand reduction in the electricity sector. This work will report over the summer, 
in time to fit with legislative timetables, should it be required”.44  DECC published a draft 
of this work the day before our scrutiny concluded, too late for us to be able to give it 
proper attention.45 
50. The draft Bill and its associated documents are fundamentally flawed by the lack of 
consideration given to demand-side measures, which are potentially the cheapest 
methods of decarbonising our electricity system. Responsive demand features only to a 
limited extent in the proposed capacity market, a subject we discuss in Chapter 5. 
 
43 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, February 2011, POSTnote 372: Future Electricity Networks 
44  Draft Energy Bill, CM 8362, May 2012, Introduction, p 21, para 35 
45 DECC, Draft Report: Capturing the full electricity efficiency potential of the UK, July 2012 
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Reducing overall demand, meanwhile, is entirely absent from the Bill. Indeed, the 
Secretary of State admitted to us that “there is a lot of work we should be doing and are 
doing on that”.46 We recommended, over a year ago, that “demand reduction should be 
placed at the heart of EMR”.47 It is completely unsatisfactory that DECC’s work was not 
completed in time to be published alongside the draft Bill. This suggests that DECC is 
still failing to give enough priority to ensuring that demand-side measures contribute 
to our energy policy goals. We are concerned that adding last-minute measures to an 
already pre-determined structure of a Bill may severely limit what can be achieved on 
demand reduction and management through EMR.  
51. We note that DECC’s draft report on capturing the full electricity efficiency 
potential of the UK identified approximately 155TWh of demand reduction potential 
in 2030 (which represents around 40% of total demand). Of this potential, current 
policy is estimated to capture only around 35%. We recommend that permanent end-
use reduction in electricity demand should feature much more prominently in the Bill 
in order to realise some of the remaining 65% savings. 
52. A systematic understanding of electricity demand and its interaction with wider energy 
policy will become increasingly important if, as the Government’s Carbon Plan suggests, 
electricity is used increasingly for heating and transport, and if demand increases by 29-
60% between 2007-2050.48 This vision of increasing demand is in stark contrast to some 
other countries. Germany, for example, aims to reduce electricity demand by 25% by 2050, 
while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95%.49  
53. A number of our witnesses emphasised the cost-effectiveness of reducing overall 
demand, although Professor Newbery did warn us of some “unsubstantiated claims that all 
demand-side is necessarily cost-effective”.50 Analysis by Garrad Hassan for WWF showed 
that energy efficiency measures could reduce the required capital investment in 
renewables, gas power stations, CCS and interconnection infrastructure by up to £40bn by 
2030.51  
54. A number of witnesses called for a Feed In Tariff for energy efficiency, although 
Professor Newbery and the CBI thought the existing demand-side policies outside of EMR 
were sufficient.52 Dustin Benton of Green Alliance told us: 
There is a refrigerator programme that has been running in the United States and it 
costs £33 per megawatt hour of electricity saved. The cheapest low-carbon form of 
power we can find right now is onshore wind at about £83 per megawatt hour. What 
we need the Bill to be able to do is procure that £33 megawatt hour of saved energy 
 
46 Q 513 
47 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Electricity Market Reform, summary 
48 Ev w126, HM Government, The Carbon Plan: Delivering Our Low Carbon Future, December 2011 
49 German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, The Energy Concept and its 
accelerated implementation, October 2011 
50 Ev 137, Ev 172, Ev 187, Q 135 [Professor Newbery], Q 235 [Ms Kelly] 
51 Ev 187, Ev 241 
52 Q 96 [Professor Mitchell], Q 235 [Mr Benton], Ev w26, Ev 172  
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over the £83 megawatt hour of new low-carbon energy. That is what a Feed In Tariff 
mechanism would do.53 
55. We note that any feed in tariff for energy efficiency would require robust methods to 
establish baseline energy use and then verify the energy savings subsequently achieved. The 
RSPB recognised this issue but also said that similar mechanisms in the US have 
demonstrably reduced demand and prices.54 
56. DECC told us that the provisions of Chapter 1 of the draft Bill could not be used to 
introduce a FiT for energy efficiency, and that an amendment to the Bill would be required 
to enable this.  
57. E3G called for the Bill to specify minimum volumes of demand reduction that the 
System Operator should procure, because current markets for energy efficiency are diffuse 
and immature, and hence a positive incentive is needed to develop those markets to 
become self-sustaining.55 
58. We note the publication of DECC’s draft report on capturing the full electricity 
efficiency potential of the UK and recommend that measures to encourage permanent 
end-use reduction in electricity demand are included in the Bill.  We recommend an 
amendment to the draft Bill to provide the Secretary of State with powers to introduce 
a Feed In Tariff for energy efficiency, if this cannot be achieved through existing 
legislation. The Bill should also include stronger measures to encourage flexible, 
responsive demand, as we discuss in more detail in later recommendations.  
An “Obligation” to source renewable energy 
59. The Renewables Obligation provides an incentive for energy suppliers to purchase 
renewable energy. This will be removed under the CfD arrangements. This could make it 
difficult for independent renewable generators to sell their electricity at reasonable prices 
(see Chapter 3). 
The Bill is likely to result in increased vertical integration and 
reduced competition 
60. The electricity market is currently dominated by six “vertically integrated” companies 
that are involved in both generating electricity and supplying customers. Independent 
generators account for around 30% of power production and independent suppliers just 
1% of Britain’s domestic retail market.56 Both the Government and Ofgem have stated a 
desire to increase competition in the electricity market and Ofgem is currently working to 
improve the opportunities for new entrants through its Retail Market Review. The 
Secretary of State reaffirmed the Government’s aspirations to us in his oral evidence: 
 
53 Q 235 [Mr Benton] 
54 Ev w26 
55 Ev 127  
56 Ev 193, “Ofgem sets out road map to open up electricity market for independent suppliers”, Ofgem Press release, 22 
February 2012 
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We want there to be many players. We want a competitive market. […] I am going 
to say in quite a strong way we need to see the market working so that these players 
[smaller independents] can get involved.57 
61. Witnesses told us that the EMR proposals as they stand will in fact deliver the exact 
opposite of this ambition; they are likely to lead to greater levels of vertical integration and 
fewer independent players in the market. It will become a “big boys’ game” that will not 
work for “little people”.58 
62. For independent generators, the proposals have introduced serious concerns about 
“routes to market” that is, whether they will be able to get a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) on good enough terms to be able to sell their power in the future. This is addressed 
in more detail in Chapter 3. 
63. For independent suppliers, the proposed counterparty arrangements for Contracts for 
Difference (CfDs) are a major difficulty. Requirements to provide letters of credit or cash 
as collateral against CfD payments and the potential balance sheet implications of the 
multiparty model might make independent supply businesses untenable. This is addressed 
at greater length in Chapter 3. 
64. The EMR provisions as they stand are likely to undermine Ofgem’s efforts to 
increase competition in the wholesale markets. We therefore recommend that the 
Government amend its current proposals to avoid the likelihood that they will lead to 
more- not less- vertical integration and consolidation in the market. (See Chapter 3). 
Fewer opportunities for smaller-scale players and CHP 
65. We heard that smaller- and community-scale projects in particular would be likely to 
be squeezed out by the proposals.59 Again this outcome is in direct contradiction to the 
Government’s declared ambitions; the Coalition Agreement states that “we will encourage 
community-owned renewable energy schemes where local people benefit from the power 
produced”.60  
66. The problems for smaller-scale projects include: 
• A lack of financial capability to deal with the complexities and uncertainties of CfDs, 
resulting in high transaction costs; and 
• Difficulties in obtaining the full “reference price” for the electricity they generate, 
resulting in lower income per unit of energy generated. 
67. The Secretary of State told us: 
 
57 Q 510 
58 Annex 1: Note from roundtable meeting 
59 Ev w26, Ev 137, Ev w37, Ev w50 (Co-Operatives UK), Ev w66, Ev 172, Ev 198, Ev w137, Ev 217 
60 HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, May 2010, p 17 
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Depending on the size, some of the smallest projects will get Feed-in Tariffs under 
the micro-generation regime, so the smaller community projects, I think below five 
megawatts, would not be in the Contract for Difference regime.61  
68. However, Co-operatives UK pointed out that many community and co-operative 
energy projects are mid-size in generation capacity (up to 10MW) and so would not be 
eligible for the micro-generation FiT. They would therefore only be eligible for the CfD 
and would encounter all of the difficulties described above.62 
69. The Combined Heat and Power Association (CHPA) notes that combined heat and 
power (CHP) and district heating are omitted from the EMR proposals. It considers that 
EMR has focussed on three ‘key’ technologies that Government wishes to encourage 
(nuclear, offshore wind and CCS) even though these have limited prospects for 
deployment at scale within the next ten years. The CHPA suggests that the current small-
scale Feed-in Tariff could support gas and renewables CHP if capacity limits were raised.63 
The Greater London Authority has also called for CHP low carbon electricity generating 
plants to receive more funding under the FiT scheme to reflect their production of heat as 
well as electricity and the cost of transporting that heat to its point of use. The GLA also 
calls for more support for smaller scaled decentralised renewable schemes.64  
70. The Coalition Agreement states that “We will encourage community-owned 
renewable energy schemes where local people benefit from the power produced”. 
However, the Renewable Obligation has not delivered community-owned schemes and 
the proposed CfDs are also unlikely to work for community schemes. A simple Fixed 
Feed-in Tariff would be a more appropriate form of support. We therefore recommend 
that this Bill provides for the Energy Act 2008 to be amended to allow for the eligibility 
threshold for small-scale FiTs to be extended to at least 10MW and potentially up to 
50MW in size. 
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3 Contracts for Difference 
71. Three designs of feed in tariff (FiT) were initially considered by the Government as a 
replacement for the Renewables Obligation (RO):  
• a Fixed-FiT (which would pay a fixed payment that generators receive instead of 
revenues from selling electricity in the market); 
• a Premium FiT (PFiT) (which would pay a fixed premium on top of the variable 
wholesale electricity price); and 
• a FiT with Contract for Difference (CfD) (which would provide a long term contract 
set at a fixed level where variable payments are made to ensure the generator receives 
the agreed tariff and where the generator would return money to consumers if 
electricity prices are higher than the agreed tariff). 
72. The consultation published in December 2010 focused on the PFiT and CfD options 
and the White Paper put forward a CfD as the preferred choice. Clause 1 of the draft Bill 
enables the Secretary of State to make regulations about Contracts for Difference (CfDs). 65 
However, not all witnesses were convinced that DECC had made the right decision. 
Professor Catherine Mitchell (along with many environmental NGOs) advocated 
scrapping CfDs in favour of a Fixed-FiT.66 Climatechangematters claimed that a Fixed FiT 
“would provide certainty, simplicity and much better value for money”.67 SSE preferred a 
PFiT, which, in its view, was “simple, understandable and bankable”. However, EDF 
warned that a PFiT could generate excessive profits for generators.68 
73. Nevertheless, there was a widespread view that CfD as a concept has attractions, most 
notably, the principle of revenue certainty provided by a long-term contract.69 Nor is the 
concept “difficult”; energy companies are used to dealing with different regimes 
internationally, and CfDs are used in Denmark and were used in Britain’s previous 
electricity market Pool arrangements.70  
74. Yet the implementing arrangements proposed have become increasingly complex, 
arguably to the extent of being unworkable.71 Witnesses argued that the reforms could be 
made to work, and that there was considerable willingness to do this, more so than for 
ditching CfDs altogether (see also paragraph 16). But the proposals as they stand in the 
draft Bill: 
 
65 DECC, Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity, CM 8099, July 
2011p 37; DECC, Electricity market reform: policy overview, Annex B: Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: 
draft operational framework, May 2012 
66 Ev 137, Ev w34, Ev w130, Ev w165, Q 96 [Professor Mitchell], Q 237 [Mr Steedman] 
67 Ev w165 
68 Q 49 [Mr De Rivaz] 
69 Ev w29, Ev 161, Ev w61, Ev 168, Ev w62, Ev w66, Ev w71, Ev w74, Ev 176, Ev 206, Ev w170, Ev w173, Ev 227, Q 7 [Ms 
Vaughan], Q 57 [Mr de Rivaz], Q 98 [Dr Kennedy] 
70 Q 407 [Secretary of State], Q 24 [Mr de Rivaz] 
71 Ev 232, Ev w79, Ev 178, Ev 211 
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• Are not “bankable” because a multiparty counterparty arrangement may be neither 
legally enforceable, nor creditworthy, and could require companies to post collateral 
and possibly be exposed to balance sheet fluctuations; 
• Introduce unacceptable levels of risk because of the possible effect of ‘rationing’ under 
the Treasury’s levy cap and a future move towards auctions affecting access to 
contracts; 
• Could result in a more concentrated market because independents and smaller-scale 
generators will be squeezed out and be unable to find routes to market;  
• Are overly complex, because they are trying to cover too many disparate technologies.  
Counterparty model 
75. The Secretary of State helpfully clarified that there are three different models of 
counterparty referred to in the debate: 
• a single counterparty with liabilities underwritten by government;  
• a multiparty counterparty arrangement, comprising suppliers; and  
• a single central counterparty organisation of new design, which is reliant on the 
payment flows between suppliers and their customers (and which is not underwritten 
by government). 72 
The shift from a single counterparty underwritten by government to 
multiparty counterparty model 
76. One of the most fundamental questions about the design of CfDs is where the liability 
for payments will ultimately sit. The 2010 EMR Consultation’s Impact Assessment and July 
2011 White Paper’s EMR Impact Assessment both suggested that under the CfD, the risk 
would be borne by Government. For example, Table 4 of the White Paper Impact 
Assessment shows the price risk being borne by Government balance sheets under a CfD 
model.73 The 2010 Assessment stated: 
Fixed payments, premium payments and CFD provide a relatively high degree of 
policy certainty for investors as they would take the form of a contract between 
Government and industry. 74 (emphasis added)  
The 2011 EMR White Paper impact assessment had this to say about the advantage of 
Contracts for Difference over Premium FiTs: 
 
 
72 Q 433 
73 DECC, Impact Assessment, Electricity Market Reform – options for ensuring electricity security of supply and 
promoting investment in low-carbon generation, 12 July 2011 
74 DECC, Impact Assessment, Electricity Market Reform – options for ensuring electricity security of supply and 
promoting investment in low-carbon generation, 14 December 2010 , p 66, para 69 
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A FiT CfD, …. insulates generators and consumers from both short-term volatility 
and the impacts of long-term price trends; higher- or lower-than expected gas prices 
have no effect on price received by the generator or bills paid by consumers. This 
means that consumers will be shielded from longer-term wholesale price increases, 
but also that they will not gain from longer-term wholesale price decreases. Changes 
in wholesale prices only affect the amount of support paid out by Government; 
hence the price risk is borne by Government balance sheets.75 
77. However, the draft Bill published in May 2012 proposed instead a “multiparty” 
payment model whereby liabilities would be borne collectively by all energy suppliers.76 
DECC claimed that in fact, it had never been the intention that Government would act as 
the counterparty, and told us: 
When you look at the description in the White Paper, what we always envisaged 
would happen was the payments would always flow from suppliers through to 
generators to make the CfD whole. I don’t think anyone really thought we would be 
talking about tax money or Treasury money being used to pay out these contracts.77 
78. While no-one would have expected the Government to be paying these contracts, 
witnesses had understood that the Government would underwrite them.78 In fact, we 
understand that DECC’s messaging to the investment community when the White Paper 
was published indicated that the Government would be underwriting the liabilities and we 
did not come across any witnesses who had not believed that this would be the case. John 
McElroy (RWE npower) outlined:79 
I would have to say clearly the original consultation and what was set out in that with 
regards to the Contract for Difference was quite important in the sense that the 
Government as the counterparty underwriting the contract in some way and the 
nature of the risks associated with these large low carbon projects, that we saw 
Government’s role in this as important in terms of reducing the cost of capital. Now 
that Government seems to be trying to push its involvement in these contracts away 
from itself, partly driven by Treasury constraints, partly driven by the State aid rules, 
inevitably that claimed cost of capital benefit is not there.80  
79. DECC’s claim to us that “in the [White Paper’s] Impact Assessment the drafting was a 
little bit unfortunate” therefore appears to be disingenuous to say the least.81 We find it 
impossible to believe that this “unfortunate drafting” does not in fact represent a policy 
shift. We suspect that this is the hand of HM Treasury at work, but its outright refusal to 
 
75 DECC, Impact Assessment, Electricity Market Reform – options for ensuring electricity security of supply and 
promoting investment in low-carbon generation, 12 July 2011, para 100 
76 DECC, Electricity market reform: policy overview, Annex B, Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: draft 
operational framework, May 2012 p 68  
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co-operate with our inquiry means we have not been able to explore the dynamic between 
HM Treasury’s balance sheet concerns and its deficit reduction priorities and DECC’s 
policy objectives.82  
DECC’s current proposal (a multiparty counterparty) 
80. The draft Bill published in May 2012 proposed a “multiparty payment model” whereby 
liabilities were borne collectively by all energy suppliers.83 The CfD would be an instrument 
created by statute that set out obligations on the generator on one side, and on all licensed 
suppliers on the other side. The payment model would run in a similar way to the existing 
Balancing and Settlement Code with a settling agent such as Elexon to invoice generators 
and suppliers. Regular but variable payments would flow to and from generators and 
suppliers and in both directions.  
Figure 1: The multiparty payment model 
 
 
81. None of the evidence received for this inquiry suggested that the draft Bill’s proposed 
“multiparty contract” (termed a “synthetic” or “virtual” counterparty by some) would work 
in practice.84 Three major problems were identified with the proposal: that it might not be 
legally enforceable, that it might not be creditworthy, and that it would have a negative 
impact on suppliers’ balance sheets. 
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Is it legal? 
82. The proposed structure has no clear legal precedent and witnesses argued that in the 
case of a contractual dispute, it was not clear with whom generators would engage to 
resolve the dispute.85 Several witnesses had seen legal advice that a contract with a synthetic 
or virtual counterparty would be legally unenforceable and for this reason, the model was 
considered to be uninvestable. 86  
Is it creditworthy? 
83. Witnesses told us that it was difficult to assess how creditworthy a “synthetic” 
counterparty was.87 The CBI said:  
The current approach is different from what was anticipated at the beginning of the 
EMR process, when it was thought that Government would underpin the contracts, 
meaning the liability would ultimately sit with an entity with an AAA credit rating. 
Under the current model, where the liability would sit collectively with suppliers, it is 
not clear what the effect on the cost of capital would be.88 
84. The Minister has subsequently told us: 
We understand some stakeholders have said that Government signing contracts 
would reduce credit risk, but given that payments ultimately flow from suppliers to 
generators, the credit risk in the scheme should reflect the robust financial health of 
the UK electricity market and form a solid base for investment. 
The Government aims to provide investors with a system with a level of certainty 
equivalent to a contract with a counterparty that has a strong credit rating, not that 
Government would be the counterparty. Our intention was not for Government to 
be signing contracts but for a credit worthy investable system.89 
What are the implications for suppliers? 
85. There is uncertainty about the accounting treatment of CfDs and in particular, whether 
they might be classed as “derivatives” (financial instruments that involve making defeasible 
payments under contract).90 If this is the case, the long term liability for CfDs may need to 
be “marked to market”, that is, shown on suppliers’ profit and loss accounts. This, in turn, 
may have implications for credit ratings. DECC has not yet received a definitive view on 
this from the large accountancy firms.91 Some of the large, vertically integrated energy 
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companies expressed concerns about this introducing volatility into their balance sheets 
that might make their investors nervous.92 However, E-ON had received limited 
reassurance on that point: 
The derivative point is a real worry and I would share the concerns already expressed 
on that. It is important that the contract, whatever it is, is not viewed as a derivative. 
We have had some good news on that in that if it is attached to a particular asset then 
it is less likely that it will be viewed as such.93 
86. A further concern for suppliers was the potential requirement to post collateral. Small 
suppliers in particular were worried about this point and argued that it would not be 
feasible for small organisations to do this. Good Energy told us:  
It is quite evident that there are concerns about having a large volume of cash linked 
to a day-ahead price going to your balance sheet. As a small supplier, that has impact 
in terms of credit and you also have to consider the collateral requirements ... It is 
one of those areas that we think needs a lot more investigation. The most recent 
impact assessment that we have seen, and I think it is publicly available, is from July 
2011, and there is no mention of small suppliers in there. 94 
87. Ecotricity said that the risk to small suppliers was “massive” in terms of the collateral 
required, given that even the large energy companies had concerns about effects on their 
credit ratings. They called for a 250,000 customer threshold if these proposals were taken 
forward, to prevent barriers to entry to the market.95 This would be similar in effect to 
proposals already implemented by DECC to exempt suppliers with under 250,000 
customers from liability for levies. Independent suppliers agreed that DECC’s proposals to 
look at shorter arrears periods would lessen but not remove the burden.96 Ofgem shares 
concerns about the potential impact of increased credit and collateral requirements on 
small suppliers and the risks to new entry, despite DECC’s reassurances in the “Policy 
Overview”.97 We consider that suggestions that small suppliers might be exempted 
partially or wholly from obligations to post collateral have merit and recommend that 
the Government takes steps to ensure that small suppliers are not disadvantaged. 
Other concerns 
88. In addition to these three problems, SSE identified a further difficulty with the 
multiparty contract model, relating to the potential for miscalculation of subsidy collection. 
It said: 
Suppliers will have to collect money in advance from consumers to pay these 
contracts. Suppliers may get this wrong and over or under collect, with huge 
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financial implications for them and consumers. This is a large threat for all suppliers 
and a huge additional barrier to new retail market entrants.98  
The third way: a single counterparty without Government underwriting 
89. The evidence suggests very strongly to us that the multiparty proposal is not 
workable.99 Centrica and EDF supported an alternative simpler bilateral model with a 
creditworthy counterparty.100A recent document from DECC confirms that an “Alternative 
Model” with a central counterparty is now under discussion.101 There would be a newly 
created central body that would sign bilateral contracts with generators. It could be 
Government or privately-owned. It would collect payments from suppliers, and the 
obligation on suppliers would require them to post collateral to cover any liabilities in a 
given period. Crucially, however, the single counterparty would not be underwritten by 
Government. Key issues under consideration include the impact of the obligation on 
suppliers, administratively and financially. 102  
Figure 2: The Alternative (central, single) Counterparty Model 
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90. It seems to us that the main difference between these two models is that in one the 
counterparty body signs contracts with generators, so addressing the legal signatory issues. 
It certainly does not change the underwriting issue.  
91. National Grid felt that the current debate was between a multi-party counterparty and 
“a thin-balance-sheet sole counterparty, effectively, which would be set up in some 
convenient way”, akin to the settlement role established in 1989 for Elexon.103 It is “doing 
work with DECC to understand how you might structure such an organisation” including 
checking that no unexpected issues might arise.104 
92. The Secretary of State told us that the model put forward by many in the industry for a 
single-party counterparty model without Government underwriting was unproblematic.105  
93. While many witnesses were aware that an “alternative model” was under consideration, 
the novelty of this proposal meant that considered input to our inquiry about its merits and 
drawbacks was limited. We also suspect that some stakeholders have mistakenly 
interpreted the new single counterparty model to be one that is underwritten by 
Government. 
94. We recommend that the Government abandons the multiparty concept and reverts 
to a single counterparty payment model, with a contract and counterparty design that 
is legally enforceable.  
95. The main purpose of the reforms was to reduce the cost of capital for investors. The 
nature of the counterparty will affect the cost of capital (see paragraph 97). In our view, 
a counterparty model that is underwritten by Government would be the best way to 
instil investor confidence and reduce financing costs. 
96. DECC must fully assess the implications of a single counterparty without 
government underwriting on suppliers’ balance sheets and on the cost of capital before 
adoption of this model. This should include an assessment of what impact this model 
would have on smaller suppliers to ensure that this counterparty model would not 
threaten the viability of these businesses. 
The need for a more rigorous Impact Assessment 
97. The Impact Assessment published alongside the White Paper in 2011 concluded that 
financing costs under a CfD would be £2.5 billion lower than under a Premium Feed-in 
Tariff. Numerous witnesses told us that this calculation was no longer valid, since it was 
based on the assumption that the Government would be the counterparty, whereas the 
draft Bill now suggests the “multiparty contract” model. The Combined Heat and Power 
Association explained why this was relevant: “the Government, as counterparty would 
have had a top AAA credit rating, but a different counterparty may not have such a high 
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rating. A lower than AAA rating would increase credit risk for investors and, therefore, the 
cost of capital”.106  
98. However, DECC told us that in fact, the Impact Assessment was based on the impact of 
removing the volatility in the revenue streams, and did not take account of the nature of 
the counterparty. The Secretary of State said that the “numbers from the impact assessment 
would not have been different” under a Government-underwritten or a multiparty 
contract model. 107 The Minister subsequently told us: 
The Impact Assessment would not […] need re-working, in order to analyse an 
alternative payment model, because the choice of counterparty doesn’t impact on its 
underpinning assumptions – which for the counterparty would be the same in either 
scenario. However, we will of course produce an updated Impact Assessment when 
we introduce the Bill.108 
99. We believe that the nature of the counterparty will have an impact on the cost of 
capital. DECC’s claim that the nature of the counterparty would not affect the outcome 
of the Impact Assessment (IA) merely reflects the lack of sophistication in the original 
assessment, rather than the likely real-world impact on the cost of capital.  
100.  The Low Carbon Finance Group has questioned the broader assumptions 
underpinning the Impact Assessment and has suggested that the results reflect a 
“theoretical approach to capital pricing, not how banks and investors allocate capital to, or 
price capital, for various investment opportunities”.109 
101. Investors also highlighted wider concerns about the direct impact of political and 
policy uncertainty on market perceptions of risk (for example, the changes to the 
counterparty arrangements and the interaction between the levy control framework and 
the CfD). The draft Bill and associated documents fail to properly assess the cumulative 
impact of policy changes and pronouncements on cost of capital. We return to this in 
paragraphs 229 – 231. 
102. DECC must update its methodology as well as the figures when revising the 
Impact Assessment (IA). The model needs to reflect real world approaches to capital 
pricing and should incorporate the impact of new risks on the cost of capital (including 
counterparty risk, development risk, risks to credit ratings and basis risk). The IA 
should specifically address the issue of how Government-underwriting (or lack thereof) 
of the CfD counterparty affects investor risks and costs.  
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Allocation of CfDs: the Levy Control Framework and use of auctions 
Impact of HM Treasury’s Levy Control Framework 
103. CfDs will fall under a cap, introduced in the 2010 Spending Review, on DECC levy-
funded spending. Deficit neutral DECC policies that are classified by the Office of National 
Statistics as tax and spend are included in the cap. HM Treasury’s Levy Control 
Framework (LCF) already sets spending limits to 2014/15 for the RO, Feed in Tariffs, and 
the Warm Home Discount. 110 The Framework says that if forecast or out-turn spend for 
any policy varies beyond a 20% “headroom” of the cap, DECC must urgently develop plans 
for bringing them back into line - or the Treasury may seek a financial contribution.111  
104. The draft Bill states “The Government is minded to instruct the System Operator to 
only issue CfDs for low-carbon generation up to the value of the amount set out in the 
Levy Control Framework. The same principle will also apply when the Secretary of State is 
issuing any investment instruments in relation to projects that require final investment 
decisions in advance of EMR implementation, and when issuing any CfDs after the CfD 
regulations come into force”.112 
105. Clause 8 of the draft Bill provides for the Secretary of State, by Order subject to 
parliamentary approval, to set out the maximum cost for the scheme by setting a financial 
cap on the scope of the national system operator to issue CfDs. It also provides for a power 
to direct the system operator “not to issue CFDs if the Secretary of State determines that 
doing so would exceed the cost cap”.113 
106. Witnesses argued that rationing CfDs to fit within a levy cap would introduce a new 
risk to developers, who could not be sure that they would be able to secure a CfD for an 
otherwise fully consented project.114 The Low Carbon Finance Group told us that certainty 
over the allocation process would be central to the ability of developers to bring forward a 
project for financing and that “at present this is one of the weakest parts of the package”.115 
Keith Anderson (Scottish Power) said: 
The concern for us would be that once we start investing […] on a large offshore 
project where I am likely to have put at risk £100 million to £150 million to get it 
there and then I get to FID [Final Investment Decision] and I do not know if I am 
going to get a contract or not, that is an unacceptable risk. So there needs to be 
enough transparency of how that levy control works and where we are against it all 
the way through that investment process and we would want enough flexibility in the 
way it is moved to say, “By the time we get to FID bring forward your project and 
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look for the contract”, you are not going to get told, “Wait 18 months because there 
is no money left”. That would be absolutely unacceptable.116 
107. Shaun Kingsbury (Low Carbon Finance Group) noted that there were also risks with 
offering contracts too early in the development process and suggested that a balance 
between the two extremes needed to be found: 
If you say up-front to anyone with even an idea of a wind farm, “Please apply for a 
CfD”, you may get 20 or 30 GW of applications. This is what happened, for example, 
in Turkey. If you wait until the very end, then people will not invest the capital to get 
there because of the risk.117 
108. Witnesses suggested that one way of dealing with this problem would be to introduce 
a pre-registration process that could provide greater security that a contract will be 
awarded earlier in the project development process.118 Gaynor Hartnell (Renewable Energy 
Association) said: 
What we think is important is that a project developer can essentially reserve a CfD 
at the point of winning planning permission; for example, they might have an option 
to take it up for, say, 18 months or a couple of years, by which time they take that 
project to the point of the making the final investment decision. Then the contract 
kicks in, and then they have a certain period of time in which to build it. It seems to 
us essential that that happens to de-risk the process. Obviously you can’t hold on to 
that allocation of a CfD or future allocation indefinitely, because you would have 
funding sterilised by, say, a project that was not going to reach fruition, so that is why 
we are suggesting, say, 18 months or two years to take it to the financial investment 
decision.119 
109. Rationing the number of CfDs under the levy cap increases development risk. We 
recommend that DECC introduces a two-step or pre-registration process to give 
developers greater confidence that they will be able to obtain a CfD before reaching 
Final Investment Decision. 
110. Two further problems with the levy cap were identified: first, the fact that early 
projects brought through under investment instruments (Chapter 4) might use up the pot 
of CfDs before other projects were able to apply. Second, that large scale projects like 
nuclear and offshore wind are “chunky” investments and may use up an annual allocation 
in one go, leaving other projects that year without CfDs.120  
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111. Suggested options for dealing with these included improving flexibility between each 
year’s allocation of CfDs, a longer term (multi-year) approach, and specifying in advance 
how many CfDs will be available for each type of technology each year.121 
112. A recent letter to us from the Minister of State has outlined further how the Levy 
Control Framework (LCF) will operate. It says that the agent allocating contracts will, in 
principle, have limited discretion over who should be allocated contracts and that precise 
allocation arrangements will depend on the “affordability within the LCF”, with legal 
obligations being fully taken into account.122 Continuing RO payments and possibly other 
levies such as ECO will come within the Levy Control Framework. The Government should 
clarify what will be defined as falling within the Levy Control Framework at an early 
date.  
113. It is essential that the Government makes clear how choices will be made by the 
agent allocating contracts, in particular in allocation between technologies. We 
recommend that reporting against the delivery plan should include details of 
commitments already entered into at FIDs or during FID-enabling discussions, and is 
transparent to other players in order to assist long term planning. 
114. Dr Kennedy (Committee on Climate Change) told us: 
We know what that [the Levy Control Framework] is out to 2015, but it is important 
to understand what that is going out beyond 2015 to 2020. We need to see a high-
level number that is commensurate with the required power sector decarbonisation 
in 2020 sooner rather than later, and we need to see some flexibility in that number, 
given the huge range of uncertainties around the kind of support that might be 
required.123  
115. The Committee on Climate Change has recently recommended that a funding 
envelope of around £8 billion in 2020 should be agreed now, with flexibility of +/-20-25% 
depending on gas prices and low carbon technology costs.124 We recommend that in order 
to provide greater confidence to developers, Government should set out  
a) the level of the funding that will be available under the Levy Control Framework 
until 2020 
b) whether the present rules on headroom will remain as they are or will be amended 
to provide more flexibility for levy allocation over the next spending  period; and 
c) whether the present mechanism of capping expenditure annually and longitudinally 
by line will be maintained or relaxed during the next spending  period. 
We note the Committee on Climate Change’s suggestion that funding available under 
the Levy Control Framework until 2020 should be around £8 billion in 2020. 
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Use of auctions 
116. DECC’s current proposals envisage moving to competitive CfD allocation processes, 
such as tenders or auctions, as early as 2017 for some technologies.125 Many witnesses 
thought that this date was too early.126 Some witnesses were opposed to the use of auctions 
at all, suggesting that it would introduce a similar type of development risk to the levy cap, 
and thus increase the cost of finance. 127 RenewableUK said: 
Introducing auctions discourages investment because there is less certainty to 
investors that their projects will receive a contract, and at what price. This will 
discourage investment in development and slow down the rate at which renewable 
projects come forward.128 
117. An additional problem with auctions is that they do not guarantee a cheaper outcome 
for consumers. Auctions may be useful but they are not the only means to secure cost 
reduction. We recommend that DECC should learn from experiences overseas and 
consider setting out a planned reduction pathway for strike prices. This would 
guarantee a reduction in the level of subsidy paid by consumers over time.129 
Ensuring routes to market  
118. The third major problem identified with the current CfD proposals is whether 
independent generators would still be able to sell their electricity under the new 
arrangements. Low levels of liquidity in the market mean that it is difficult for smaller and 
independent generators to sell directly into the market (for example via the power 
exchanges). Instead, smaller generators often sign long-term contracts called Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs), usually with large vertically integrated energy suppliers. 
Through these, independents sell power at a discount to market rates; they receive less for 
their energy because they are reducing their risk through having longer term contracts. 
PPAs are important for smaller generators who do not have a large in-house trading 
capacity, and for intermittent generators who cannot produce electricity on demand in the 
same way as a traditional generator.130 Vertically integrated businesses, in contrast, are not 
reliant on PPAs because they are able to hedge risks between the generation and supply 
parts of their business. 
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119. The Renewables Obligation (RO) provided an incentive for larger suppliers to enter 
into PPAs, but the CfD proposals do not. In the absence of an obligation, PPAs might only 
be available at a steep discount – leading to a concern that the price received under any 
future PPAs will be significantly below market price.131 In CfD terms, this means 
independent generators would not be able to achieve the “reference” price, leaving them 
with lower returns than the bigger players. Gordon MacDougall of Renewable Energy 
Systems told us:132 
One thing in terms of maintaining the RO, which seems to be lost, is that the RO was 
more than just a certificate system. It was a physical obligation on the suppliers to 
source the right kind of energy and that has been lost in all of this. I think that is a 
much more significant departure than many people seem to recognise because one of 
the big problems with a CfD is there is not sufficient liquidity in the market for 
independent generators to trade and, as such, they require a PPA. Without the 
obligation on the supply companies, there is no incentive for them whatsoever to 
offer sensible PPAs to make these projects bankable. 
120. The absence of “bankable” PPAs could mean that independents will struggle to raise 
finance for new projects. Ian Temperton (Climate Change Capital) told us that “people 
wanting third-party finance will need Power Purchase Agreements. They will need to give 
their financiers a surety that their product is going to get into the market”.133  
121. Annex B of the EMR policy overview states that Government “believes suppliers and 
independent aggregators will continue to offer PPAs as there will be commercial 
opportunities for doing so”.134 Witnesses were sceptical about this idea, suggesting that 
historical precedents were not promising.135 For example, the NETA trading arrangements 
that were introduced in the 2001 were expected to encourage aggregators, but in practice 
delivered vertical integration.136 The Renewable Energy Association told us “they 
[aggregators] will only enter the market if there is some margin that they can earn. There is 
none”.137 RES argued that the existence or not of aggregators was “wholly missing the 
point” because “the question is not whether or not PPAs will be offered, but it is whether 
the PPAs will be viable or not”.138 
122. RES warned that failure to resolve this issue could lead to the pipeline of new 
renewable energy projects drying up. It said: 
If there is not an effective route-to-market available by mid 2015, the market for 
independent renewable generators will come to a halt, with independents being 
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unable to progress projects under either the old RO structure or the new CfD 
Structure.139 
123. DECC has belatedly acknowledged that access to the market is a serious problem and 
on 5 July 2012, it launched a call for evidence “to help independent renewable generators 
access the electricity market”.140 This is yet another example of the policy and practical 
arrangements underpinning EMR still being in the process of formation.  
124. Access to market for independent generators under the CfD arrangements is an 
extremely serious issue that must be resolved before a Bill can be introduced. We 
recommend that DECC expedites its review of evidence on access to the electricity 
market for renewable generators to ensure that a solution to this issue is identified 
before the Bill is introduced to Parliament in the “autumn”.  
125. One possible answer is to improve the liquidity in the market. Ofgem has work 
underway in this area and is currently consulting on proposals to require vertically 
integrated companies to sell 25% of their generation output in the forward market.141 
However, we heard concerns that Ofgem’s current work would not deliver sufficient 
liquidity and that it would probably not include enough mandatory measures.142 Ofgem’s 
evidence did not address the wider market liquidity issues.143  
126. Three other potential solutions were put forward: 
• A “buyer of last resort” mechanism could be introduced.144 The impact of this would be 
equivalent to a fixed FiT and capacity using this route would not be responding to 
market signals (because generators would be guaranteed a buyer, even when the market 
price was low and indicating that their generation was outweighing consumer 
demand). It would therefore go against the overall principle of maintaining a 
competitive market.145 
• Introduce an obligation (or some other incentive) on suppliers to source energy from 
low carbon generation. For example, by making a proportion of the costs of CfDs 
proportional to the amount of low carbon energy they secure.146  
• Delay the closure of the RO to new entrants.147  
127. In paragraph 70 we recommended that the FiT for small-scale generation should be 
increased to include projects at least 10MW in size. This would eliminate the route to 
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market problem for all projects in this category. In paragraph 211 we make 
recommendations about the timetable for closing the RO. 
128. We recommend that as part of its review of access to market for independent 
generators, DECC should examine the following options: introducing a buyer of last 
resort; introducing an incentive for suppliers to source energy from low-carbon 
generation; extending the micro-gen FiT to projects up to 50MW in size; and holding 
open the RO for new entrants in the event that the PPA market disappears. 
Other issues 
Length of contracts 
129. Clause 4 of the draft Bill allows the terms of a CfD to include its duration. DECC’s 
draft operational framework for CfDs proposes that this will be 15 years for renewable 
technologies and 10 years (with the possibility of varying this) for CCS projects under the 
commercialisation programme. The Government has not yet formed a view on how long 
nuclear CfDs will last for, but says it would expect no less than 15 years.148 Renewables and 
CCS organisations argue that the length of CfDs for their technologies should be linked to 
project lifetime and therefore longer than the 15 or 10 years proposed.149  
Setting the strike price 
130. Clause 5 of the draft Bill allows for the setting of strike prices either administratively, 
competitively or through a combination of the two methods. Initially, strike prices will be 
set administratively for each technology, before moving to the use of auctions. The 
negotiation processes will be different for different types of low-carbon energy:  
• Renewables: the process will be similar to the most recent RO Banding Review. The 
System Operator (National Grid) will conduct an analysis of costs and deployment 
potentials, which will feed in to a cost benefit analysis of different strike prices on 
security, carbon and cost objectives. Based on this analysis, a report from a panel of 
experts, and—possibly—the advice of the Committee on Climate Change, the Secretary 
of State will make a decision on the strike prices. However the experience of the latest 
RO review, when for example the decision about the support for onshore wind was 
widely rumoured to be the subject of disagreement between DECC and the Treasury, 
does not inspire confidence among potential investors that the process will be 
determined exclusively by an objective analysis of the available evidence. 
• CCS: for early stage CCS projects (including those supported under the CCS 
Commercialisation Programme), there will be a negotiation between developers and 
DECC. It will be possible to set different strike prices for different projects in order to 
take account of the wide variety of technologies and location-specific costs.  
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• Nuclear: the level of the strike price will be determined through an administrative price 
setting process, which will involve “negotiation with developers on a project by project 
basis”. 150 
The strike price for nuclear 
131. Witnesses raised concerns about transparency in setting the nuclear strike price in 
bilateral negotiation, with little opportunity to move to auctions or competitive price 
setting. 151 Although Vincent de Rivaz (EDF) told us that “the strike price will not be 
defined in a cosy way through hidden decisions” and that the result would be “absolutely 
open and transparent”,152 Richard Hall (Consumer Focus) was not convinced:  
In a bilateral negotiation where there is only one player in the room and that player 
can say, “Take it or leave it; these are our terms”, I have very little confidence that 
that is an efficient way of deriving a price.153  
132. Which? recommended that further detail was needed in the Bill about how contract 
negotiations will be made transparent, how arrangements will be scrutinised and how the 
Government and System Operator will be held accountable.154 
133. The Government is proposing that an “expert panel” will be appointed to scrutinise 
the System Operator’s assessment of costs and deployment potentials for renewables. We 
asked the Secretary of State whether an expert panel might also scrutinise the negotiation 
of the nuclear strike price. He told us: “We do not currently believe they should have a 
role”.155 
134. We are concerned that the proposed process for setting the nuclear strike price 
lacks sufficient transparency. The perception that decisions are being made “behind 
closed doors” could be highly damaging to the low-carbon agenda and may further 
undermine consumer trust in energy companies. It is essential that the negotiations 
deliver, and are perceived to deliver, value for money to consumers. We recommend 
that an independent panel of experts should be appointed to oversee the negotiations 
and to report to Parliament on the adequacy of the outcome and value for money for 
consumers. 
The likely cost of nuclear 
135. Witnesses from environmental NGOs, argued that the strike price for nuclear was 
likely to be higher than that for renewables, perhaps as much as £160/MWh.156 We note 
that a Times report of the 16th July 2012 indicated that the asking strike price for new nuclear 
 
150 DECC, Electricity market reform: policy overview, Annex B, Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: draft 
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would be £165/MWh. Vincent de Rivaz (EDF) however said “we are confident that the 
strike price agreed will reveal the competitiveness of nuclear new build compared to other 
forms of low carbon generation”.157 
136.  Since there is little competitive pressure or prospect of moving to auctions for new 
nuclear, we are concerned that the strike price for nuclear could be driven upwards. We 
hope that industry claims that the cost of nuclear is competitive with other forms of 
low-carbon energy will be reflected in the offers they put forward during strike price 
negotiations. We do not believe that a nuclear strike price higher than that given to 
offshore wind would represent good value for money to the consumer. The Secretary of 
State should not agree to contracts of this nature.  
Longer-term price visibility  
137. To provide developers and investors with the visibility to make investment decisions, 
the draft operational framework for CfDs proposes that five years of strike prices for 
renewables will be published in the delivery plan in late 2013 with indicative prices in the 
draft delivery plan, published in mid 2013.158  
138. Aquamarine Power (a company involved in developing wave power devices) told us 
that they needed more certainty about what the strike price would be on a longer timescale. 
It said: 
It is the strike price for marine energy after 2017 which is critical for the growth of 
the marine energy industry. We remain concerned that early-stage investors will find 
it hard to make an investment case for early arrays without clear sight of the market 
towards 2020 and beyond.159  
139. Government should provide clarity on the strike price level beyond 2017 as soon as 
possible in order to provide certainty and help secure investment for emerging 
technologies, such as wave and tidal power. 
State aid and a “one-size fits all” package 
140. EU state aid rules seek to ensure that Member States do not unjustifiably distort the 
single market through financial or other interventions. Any new scheme under EMR will 
have to be submitted to the European Commission and many aspects of the EMR 
proposals will need clearance.160 If a scheme or technology falls under previous case law or 
block exemptions however, then the clearance process may be completed quickly. Article 
23 of the General Block Exemption Regulation provides (subject to conditions, such as the 
 
157 Letter from Mr de Rivaz to Tim Yeo MP, 5 July 2012, available at: www.parliament.uk/eccpublications; Ev 165 
158 DECC, Electricity market reform: policy overview, Annex B, Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: draft 
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159 Ev w58 
160 Q 488 [Mr Virley], Q 493 
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amount of aid provided) that environmental investment aid for the promotion of energy 
from renewable energy sources is compatible with the single market. 161 
141. SSE considered that the clearance process for CfDs might be lengthened through them 
covering both renewables and nuclear, to which Article 23 does not apply. 162 There are also 
questions about the nature of the counterparty and whether this could fall foul of state aid 
rules; if the Secretary of State or a government owned body were the counterparty, the 
funds could be perceived as belonging, albeit temporarily, to the state and being directed by 
it. This might increase the likelihood of a scheme being viewed as state aid.  
142. DECC accepts that “the eventual assessment [of whether CfDs amount to state aid] 
may depend on the detail of policy design”. If EMR is classified as state aid, DECC 
considers that this should still be approvable under the Treaty because:163 
The EMR is designed to secure new investment in low carbon generation, while 
maintaining energy security and diversity. EMR will minimise costs to the consumer, 
and the specific instruments under EMR are designed to minimise distortions of 
competition. So long as the balance of assessment is positive, any aid should be 
compatible with the Treaty. 
143. The Secretary of State told us that “We think we will find favour” with the EU, because 
the EMR proposals share EU objectives. 164 Nuclear wrapped up within an EMR package 
may therefore pass an approval process, whereas if presented outside the package, it likely 
would not. It is possible that the Commission will take a view on different technologies, but 
DECC told us that they did “not see the fact that we are notifying for nuclear necessarily 
holding up any decision on renewables”.165  
144. Witnesses shared the widespread perception that EMR, and specifically CfDs, are a fig 
leaf over support for new nuclear.166 The Green Alliance thought that the state aid issue was 
probably why the “obvious” and “simple” decision, to have the government as 
counterparty, had not been taken.167 The REA believed that the state aid question had been 
driven by nuclear, and it was a “great pity” that renewables had been tied up in that 
policy.168 
145. We conclude that state aid as well as political considerations have influenced the 
design of the CfD package, and have caused policy and financial support for nuclear to 
be rolled up with that for renewables. Logic suggests that the Government should 
differentiate nuclear from other low-carbon technologies within an overall FiT regime. 
 
161 Commission Regulation EC 800/2008; renewables defined as “renewable non-fossil energy sources: wind, solar, 
geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower installations, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases”, 
i.e. not including nuclear. 
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The Committee will consider further the building of new nuclear and its associated 
challenges later in the year.169 
146. Given that the Government (and the Committee on Climate Change) see nuclear 
playing a key role in the future energy mix, Government should consider how carbon 
and security objectives could be delivered if no new nuclear is forthcoming.  
  
 
169 Building new nuclear: the challenges ahead, 27 April 2012 
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4 Investment Instruments 
147. The White Paper stressed the need for clarity and certainty to engender investor 
confidence. But it also recognised that changes to the market under EMR could lead to 
some investment decisions being delayed because they are planned to be taken before the 
introduction of CfDs in 2014.170  
148. Chapter 2 (Clauses 14-19) of the draft Bill provides for the Secretary of State to issue 
“investment instruments” in order to prevent investment decisions being delayed by the 
EMR process. The instruments will in effect be as binding as the forthcoming CfD regime 
and seek to avoid a hiatus by providing “certainty for developers on the revenue stream 
that will be forthcoming”.171 
149. DECC will enter into discussions with developers whose projects meet certain criteria 
(including timing, and ineligibility for support under the RO). 172 A range of “Final 
Investment Decision [FID]-enabling products” may be used varying from letters of 
comfort to an issue of a CfDs once powers exist; to be determined on a case by case basis. 173 
The negotiation process may produce binding arrangements on the terms of the CfD, 
including the contract duration, risk allocation, strike price and financeability.174 
150. The main focus of the debate on investment instruments has been the plan for a new 
nuclear power plant, Hinkley Point C. EDF said: 
EDF Energy and our co-investor Centrica have recently started discussions with 
DECC on Final Investment Decision (FID) Enabling to support our project at 
Hinkley Point C. It is important that this process is conducted in a timely manner 
and results in a legally binding agreement. 175 
151. As with the general debate on setting the strike price for nuclear (see paragraphs 131-
134), many witnesses expressed concern that there was a lack of transparency and 
accountability in the investment instrument negotiations for Hinkley C176. EDF and 
Centrica have sent in their letter of eligibility for Hinkley C, so the negotiations “have not 
really started” although the next step is how to arrive at a strike price.177 EDF assured us 
that there would be openness and transparency in the process and that the outcome would 
be “as good as if there was an auction”.178 RWE npower (who are trying to sell their 
 
170 DECC, Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon electricity, CM 8099, July 
2011p 37; DECC, Electricity market reform: policy overview, Annex B, Feed-in tariff with contracts for difference: 
draft operational framework, May 2012 
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172 DECC, Planning our electric future: technical update, December 2011, p 38 
173 DECC, Electricity Market Reform (EMR): Final Investment Decision (FID) Enabling, Impact Assessment, IA No: 
DECC0083, 16 April 2012 Fig. 3, p 13 
174 DECC, Electricity Market Reform (EMR): Final Investment Decision (FID) Enabling, Impact Assessment, IA No: 
DECC0083, 16 April 2012 p 7 
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Horizon Nuclear Power project) were not convinced and wanted to see more transparency 
around the Hinkley C project.179 Given that EDF and Centrica was the first project to be 
put forward for consideration, RWE wanted transparency around the terms and 
conditions offered, so that subsequent projects were not disadvantaged.180  
152. SSE argued that if an investment instrument was provided to a nuclear developer, it 
would be hard to see how it would not be challenged by the Commission as state aid.181 
However, EDF were not perturbed and told us that the “principle of the transitional 
arrangements is to make early investment possible, for which there is a strong case. It is 
simply a practical arrangement with, we believe, no bias and therefore no State Aid 
implications”.182 
153. We share the concerns of many witnesses about the transparency of the FID-
enabling process. Hinkley C is the first project to be considered under the process. We 
recommend that DECC ensures that any contract terms agreed are published as soon as 
possible. We also recommend that, as with setting strike prices under the CfD 
mechanism, an independent panel of experts should be appointed to oversee the 
investment instrument negotiations, and should report to Parliament on value for 
money for consumers (see paragraph 134). 
154. Under Clause 14 an investment instrument may provide for payments based on a 
strike price and a market reference price and include such provision as the Secretary of 
State considers necessary or desirable and, in particular, provision about various matters 
listed in clause 14(6) and covering the same areas as those to be covered in provisions 
included in a CfD. The draft Bill provides for investment instruments to be issued during 
the passage of the legislation and, if they comply with certain conditions including being 
laid before Parliament, puts a duty on the Secretary of State to issue the instruments after 
the Bill is enacted.183 Clause 16 provides for a similar process for the issuing of instruments 
between the Bill’s enactment and the end of 2015. 
155. Although Clause 19 does provide for further provision to be made in regulations 
about investment instruments (and those regulations will be subject to the negative 
procedure), there is no provision for formal Parliamentary scrutiny of investment 
instruments (no negative or affirmative procedures), beyond the requirement for the 
instruments to be laid. The implication is that instruments which may form a key aspect of 
the development of the electricity market until at least the end of 2015, will not be subject 
to the same level of Parliamentary scrutiny as those made through CfD regulations (which 
will be negative procedure), after the Bill becomes an Act. This may lead to concerns over a 
lack of transparency and Parliamentary control.  
 
179 Ev 178; In 2009 RWE npower formed a joint venture with E.ON UK called Horizon Nuclear Power to explore the 
possibility of developing new nuclear power station in the UK 
180 Q 52 [Mr McElroy] 
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5  Capacity Mechanism  
156. The aim of a capacity mechanism would be to provide an insurance policy to reduce 
the likelihood of future blackouts and to ensure a reliable electricity supply to consumers. 
At the moment, generators are only paid for the electricity that they produce. A capacity 
mechanism would change this by making payments for the availability of capacity in order 
to ensure there is sufficient spare capacity on the system to avoid blackouts.  
Need for the mechanism 
157. DECC believes there is no immediate threat to the security of electricity supply, with 
83 GW of generating capacity available at the end of 2010 compared to a peak demand of 
61 GW.184 Beyond this its analysis suggests a risk to security of supply as a large amount of 
existing generating plant is due to close while an increasing amount of low-carbon, 
intermittent or inflexible generation is needed to meet the UK’s carbon reduction targets. 
Renewables and nuclear plant have low running costs, and future fossil fuel plant such as 
gas will therefore only run to supplement this generation.185 This will create uncertainty of 
revenues for fossil plant, and DECC is concerned that this could lead to under-investment 
and uncomfortably low levels of reliable capacity.186 
158. Although the central scenario in DECC’s modelling indicated that a capacity problem 
would not occur until the 2020s, its “stress test” (i.e. worst case scenario) suggested that a 
capacity problem could occur in the second half of this decade.187 DECC argued that this 
uncertainty meant the legal framework for a capacity mechanism needed to be put in place 
as soon as possible, so that the first capacity auction could be held in 2014 for capacity to be 
in place “by 2015/2016” if necessary.188 Its modelling suggested that “in some years” we 
could see blackouts affecting up to 2.5 million homes unless action was taken.189  
159. The Minister told us that because DECC does not envisage the mechanism being 
needed “for a couple of years at least”, the detail of its operation does not need to be 
finalised.190 Chapter 3 of the draft Bill (Clauses 20 to 30) therefore only provides enabling 
powers for the Secretary of State to design and introduce a capacity market in Great 
Britain.191 With many details of the market still lacking, our scrutiny of the proposals 
embodied in the draft Bill was unavoidably limited. However, we do have some high-level 
comments based upon the evidence we received during this inquiry. 
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Uncertainty over the mechanism 
160. The draft Bill would give the Secretary of State powers to introduce a capacity market, 
but these would only be used if and when Ministers decide a market is needed. This 
decision will be based on analysis provided by the System Operator – National Grid – and 
possibly other technical experts including Ofgem.192 Although not all of our witnesses were 
convinced that the case has been made for a Capacity Mechanism, others were 
supportive.193 In any case, there was general agreement that now the Government has 
proposed the mechanism, clarity is needed to avoid a hiatus in investment in new 
capacity.194 Ian Marchant of SSE, for example, told us that: 
the biggest issue at the moment is the uncertainty: effectively, the Government has 
created a known unknown. They have said there will be a capacity mechanism but 
not what it will be, and once you’ve gone down that road you’ve got to get it certain 
quickly so that any investments can be decided, because boards, my board included, 
will say, “We will wait until we see what that mechanism is.” We have created a 
situation where we now need to get a capacity mechanism in.195 
161. The Secretary of State told us that DECC has “tried to give a very clear signal” that 
there need not be such a hiatus, because any capacity built since publication of the draft Bill 
will be categorised as “new” in any future capacity auction.196 Nevertheless, there is a risk 
that the need for a capacity mechanism may now become a self-fulfilling prophesy – that 
an investment hiatus caused by policy uncertainty will deliver the precise capacity problem 
that DECC aims to avoid.  
162. We heard that a standard of reliability could provide helpful clarity over what a 
capacity market would be aiming to achieve.197 This is the approach taken in some US 
markets, where decisions on the required level of capacity are based on a minimum 
standard of reliability, such as “interruption of electricity supplies due to insufficient 
capacity on no more than 0.1 days per year”.198 Indeed, National Grid, who would run the 
proposed auction, told us that “one would have to define what output we are trying to 
have” and that an “objective way of discussing security of supply would be useful to 
everybody”.199  
163. The Secretary of State told us that he is “open-minded about the role of targets”, and 
DECC is considering defining and using an enduring “reliability standard” to inform 
Ministers’ decision on the amount of capacity needed. 200 However, in Annex C to the EMR 
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Policy Overview, DECC also said that “if we did adopt a reliability standard, we would 
expect Ministers to retain scope for their annual decision on the amount of capacity to 
contract for to vary from the reliability standard to ensure that costs and reliability can be 
balanced”. This would introduce a political element into the decision making process, 
which could reduce certainty for investors.201 
164. The deferral of a firm decision to implement a capacity market creates uncertainty 
and risks a hiatus in investment. The Energy Bill should be based on a clear 
Government position on the circumstances in which a market will be introduced, and 
how this will be reviewed and updated over time. The Government should set out an 
enduring reliability standard, which, along with a decarbonisation target for electricity, 
would provide a clear framework for the System Operator to work within when 
operating a capacity market. 
Design of the mechanism 
165. There are three steps involved in the design of capacity mechanisms: 
a) Analyse the risks to reliability that the mechanism will need to address; 
b) Determine the products or services that the mechanism will need to procure; and 
c) Decide how the required products or services should be valued. 
166. We heard that the focus of debate to date has been on the third step: whether or not 
the System Operator should run a market-wide auction for provision of future capacity or 
procure “strategic reserve” capacity.202 However, the first two steps are also important 
because we cannot assume that our traditional approach to ensuring reliability will be 
appropriate in the future, for example in the case of an electricity system with a high 
proportion of intermittent renewable generation.203 
167. In Annex C of the EMR Policy Overview, DECC said that the Capacity Market would 
be a competitive auction, run by the System Operator, based on a forecast of future peak 
demand and its role would be to deliver a total required volume of capacity defined by 
Ministers.204 The European Climate Foundation told us that this “total volume” approach 
is based on the assumption that system reliability is most under stress at the time of peak 
demand, and that delivering a total volume of capacity that sufficiently exceeds peak 
demand will ensure reliability at all times.205  
168. This assumption may not hold true for our future electricity system. Modelling for the 
south of Great Britain has suggested that the greatest challenge to reliability by 2030 will 
arise not at times of peak demand, but when consumer demand and the varying output of 
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intermittent renewable generation are changing in opposite directions.206 This could occur 
at any time and to the greatest extent when demand is increasing to a maximum while 
intermittent generation is reducing to a minimum, or vice versa. The flexibility of the 
remaining capacity on the system will thus become at least as important as its total 
volume.207 Other witnesses have agreed that the characteristics of capacity, such as how 
long it takes for it to respond and then remain available, are crucial and need attention.208  
169. DECC has stated that the market will not specifically contract for flexible capacity.209 It 
anticipates that the electricity market will continue to provide adequate signals to bring 
forward the right mix of flexible capacity, and that the existing balancing mechanism will 
continue to ensure moment-to-moment system balancing through services such as Short 
Term Operating Reserve (STOR). However, DECC also said that it intends to consider this 
further when developing the design of the Capacity Market.210 Indeed, the Minister told us 
that “the capacity mechanism [...] is actually something that needs to represent 
flexibility.”211 
170. In our original EMR inquiry we said that the Government needed to analyse more 
fully the potential need for flexible capacity and demand-side measures at all times, not just 
at times of peak demand.212 In its White Paper of July 2011, DECC committed to outlining 
its electricity systems policy in summer 2012, “focusing on challenges around balancing 
and system flexibility”. It is very unsatisfactory that this policy was not published alongside 
the draft Bill to be available for our pre-legislative scrutiny.  
171. We are extremely concerned that the capacity market proposals are based upon 
out-dated assumptions and an insufficient analysis of the future risks to reliability. We 
recommend that the Government undertakes much clearer analysis of the problem that 
the capacity market is trying to solve, particularly the integration of the large volume of 
intermittent generation that is likely to be required to decarbonise our electricity 
supplies, and of the role capacity payments can play in furthering demand side 
response and reduction measures. The enabling legislation in the Energy Bill must be 
able to meet our future reliability challenges. 
Minimising costs for consumers 
172. At the initial consultation stage, the Government stated a preference for a “strategic 
reserve” capacity mechanism but subsequently decided, in light of representations from 
industry and elsewhere, that a market-wide mechanism would be better.213 However, RWE 
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npower214 has since told us that a reserve would be more than ten times cheaper – a cost of 
£300-650m over the period 2015-25 compared to £7.5bn for a market-wide mechanism.215 
DECC’s own analysis, as published in its Capacity Mechanism Impact Assessment, also 
found a strategic reserve to be cheaper. The estimated net cost was £1.1bn over the period 
2010-2030216 compared to a business as usual scenario, whereas the estimated net cost of a 
capacity market was £2.5bn.217 However, DECC did not believe that these costs were 
representative of the impacts of each mechanism, and so also compared them qualitatively.  
173. One of DECC’s key qualitative concerns, not modelled in the net costs, was the 
“slippery slope” problem.218 This would occur if, by preventing high prices at times of 
system stress, the strategic reserve reduced the market-based incentive for investment in 
new capacity. As we discussed in our previous inquiry on EMR, more and more capacity 
would then be required in the reserve to ensure the reserve remained effective.219 
174. Evidence we received suggested that if the proposed capacity market delivers 
insufficient flexible capacity, there is a risk that the System Operator would have to use 
additional mechanisms to ensure reliability, leading to unnecessarily high costs.220 The 
European Climate Foundation told us that the Energy Bill should include a mandate for 
the Regulator to establish an incentive framework for the System Operator to minimise the 
costs of delivering reliability.221 
175. We recognise that a more thorough assessment of cost-effectiveness must await the 
publication of detailed capacity market proposals. DECC should conduct further 
analysis on the costs of the capacity market to ensure it is not significantly higher than 
alternative options such as a strategic reserve. The Government should clarify how the 
Energy Bill will ensure that the capacity delivered by auctions will have the appropriate 
characteristics, such as flexibility, and how this relates to the System Operator’s existing 
system balancing role, in order to ensure that costs are minimised.  
Technology options for providing capacity 
176. Clause 20(3) of the draft Bill states that “providing capacity” to the capacity market 
means providing electricity or reducing demand for electricity. The market would be open 
to new or existing generating capacity as well as non-generation approaches such as 
demand response, storage and interconnection. 
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Generation technologies 
177. In terms of generation technology, we heard two conflicting stories of what EMR will 
achieve: some said not enough gas power stations; some said too many. We discuss the 
future role of gas further in Chapter 9 (paragraphs 221 – 223). 
178. Intergen, an independent generator operating gas-fired power stations, told us of a 
range of issues that need to be addressed for the capacity mechanism to support both 
existing and new generation.222 Among these, it highlighted that to build a new combined 
cycle gas turbine takes around seven years – three to gain consent, one to tender and 
contract, and three to construct. If the Government identifies a need for new generation 
capacity this decade, Intergen’s evidence suggests that it is unlikely to be brought about by 
capacity auctions that may or may not be held from 2014, as the Government currently 
suggests. 
179. Stag Energy, a company with interests in gas generation and storage, argued that it 
will be challenging to maintain a 15 – 20 % capacity margin without the construction of 12 
– 15 GW of new gas generation over the coming decade.223 Its analysis showed that existing 
coal and gas plant has “much higher running costs” than new combined cycle or open 
cycle gas turbines. These new, more flexible plant are more expensive to build but have a 
lower overall running cost at reduced levels of demand. Stag Energy warned that the 
proposed capacity market, with its single clearing price model, risks penalising new, more 
efficient plant while rewarding existing plant.224 
180. Indeed, experience in the USA suggests that while capacity markets are attractive to 
existing resources, they do not encourage investment in new generation. The New England 
2010 Annual Report notes that with the looming possibility that some of the region’s older 
resources will retire, the ability of its capacity market to attract timely investment in new 
generation “remains largely untested”.225 
181. The Committee on Climate Change has said that investment in around 10 GW of new 
unabated gas generation over the next two decades, and a total gas-fired capacity of 30 GW 
in 2030, would have an important role in balancing intermittent renewable generation by 
generating at low annual load factors (less than 10% on average in 2030). However, the 
Committee has expressed concern that EMR proposals – particularly the Emissions 
Performance Standard – will allow a greater role for gas generation.226 It said that if 30 GW 
of gas plant were to generate at baseload (i.e. the majority of the time) in 2030 instead of 
only as balancing plant, average emissions would be 200 gCO2/kWh – well over what we 
need them to be to meet our statutory carbon budgets. 
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182. A number of our witnesses shared the concern that EMR, as embodied by the draft 
Bill, will lead to a “dash for gas” that will make it harder to achieve our statutory emissions 
reduction targets.227  
183. As we recommend in paragraph 223, it is vital to have an understanding of the 
likely impact of EMR of the future role for gas generation. DECC should conduct 
modelling work to assess the combined impact of the capacity market and the EPS on 
emissions and security outcomes under different scenarios. This should include both a 
“dash for gas before 2015” scenario and a “no new gas before 2015” scenario 
184. Related to the issue of new investment in generation Stag Energy highlighted the need 
for gas storage, both to ensure security of supply and to minimise fuel price volatility.228  In 
our energy security inquiry, we concluded that the UK needs to significantly increase its 
gas storage capacity.229 We recommend that the Government, in its forthcoming Gas 
Strategy, considers the interrelationship between electricity market reform and the 
capabilities of the gas infrastructure, in particular the potential need for more gas 
storage. 
Non-generation technologies 
185. In the supporting documentation to the draft Bill, DECC says it is keen that non-
generation technologies and approaches, such as demand-side response, storage and 
interconnected capacity, “can play a fair and equivalent role to generation in a DSR 
Capacity Market”.230 However, many of our witnesses criticised the draft Bill and its 
supporting documentation for its lack of detail on these approaches.231  
186. Friends of the Earth told us that: 
it is unlikely that the existence of a capacity market alone will provide sufficient 
incentive for investment in innovative storage and DSR technologies to be developed 
to the point that they can deliver capacity with complete certainty and be bid into a 
capacity market auction at a cost that can compete with established fossil fuel supply 
technologies. Getting technologies to this point requires significant R&D, early 
deployment support and preference within the capacity market.232 
187. Green Alliance reported that experience from the USA demonstrated the risk that the 
market would not incentivise innovative technologies like demand-side response. It said 
that in the USA’s PJM market: 
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much of the capacity payments initially went to existing fossil power stations and a 
‘clean first’ priority system had to be introduced to ensure that DSR was able to 
compete fairly. As with demand reduction, given the immature nature of the 
demand response market, it is likely to be necessary to proactively seek out demand 
response to ensure that the maximum economic level of DSR is developed.233 
188. A number of our witnesses agreed that, as innovative technologies, DSR and storage 
would need support to enable them to develop and compete in the market.234 This could be 
achieved by amending the Bill to require the System Operator to procure minimum 
volumes in the capacity auction, and/or to seek out and prioritise them over other 
approaches.235 Such support would help kick‐start the market in the provision of these 
services and ensure the System Operator develops the necessary systems and expertise to 
exploit the benefits of demand response.236 RWE npower told us that it is vital that the 
legislation sets out a clear mechanism for the demand-side to contribute, because otherwise 
the £12bn that energy companies will invest in smart meters (ultimately at consumers’ 
expense) will be a substantial lost opportunity.237 
189. However, two of our witnesses did not think extra measures to support demand-side 
measures were necessary in the Bill, since it is already complex and because demand-side 
policies exist elsewhere already.238 Professor Newbery also warned us of “unsubstantiated 
claims that all demand-side is necessarily cost-effective”.239 
190. On storage specifically, the Electricity Storage Network (ESN) highlighted that 
existing legislation does not explicitly define or address the role of storage in the electricity 
market, and that this causes confusion and uncertainty about its treatment.240 The ESN 
suggested that it is not appropriate to include electricity storage simply as a generation 
activity, as it can provide other services such as absorbing power at times of excess 
production by wind and other intermittent generation. ABB, with experience of deploying 
the UK’s first battery energy storage device, also identified “significant legal challenges” 
that need to be overcome in relation to the treatment of energy absorption and resupply to 
the grid.241 
191. As innovative technologies, demand-side response and storage technologies should 
be recognised and defined explicitly in the Energy Bill. Support for innovation is given 
to the supply-side, for example by the banding of the Renewables Obligation, and the 
Bill should provide similar support to demand-side and storage technologies. DECC 
should investigate the legislative and other barriers to storage identified by our 
witnesses, and remove any that prevent it from competing fairly in the market. 
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192. Witnesses warned that it is unclear how the proposed capacity market would work 
with the move to a more integrated European electricity market, and potentially larger 
balancing areas. Simon Skillings told us that if a neighbouring market does not have a 
margin of spare capacity, “all that happens is that you need to keep running to stand still, 
because every time you build something to get your margin, they will shut something next 
door to keep their price going up”.242 This is another area the Government said it is 
considering as part of its detailed design work for the capacity market.243 
193. The Government should clarify how the capacity market will be made compatible 
with increased interconnection and the move to a more integrated European electricity 
market. 
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6 Conflicts of Interest 
194. We previously recommended that if the role of administering CfDs was not taken by 
Ofgem, a new institution should be established to take this role. This institution should be 
“totally independent and not susceptible to political influence”.244 However, DECC has 
proposed that the System Operator (SO), National Grid, will provide analysis to 
Government on strike prices and will administer the CfD and the Capacity Market. 
Chapter 4 of the draft Bill acknowledges the potential for conflicts of interest between this 
EMR delivery role and National Grid’s existing roles (including transmission network 
ownership, CCS businesses, interconnection and offshore wind transmission).245 DECC is 
currently working with Ofgem to assess any conflicts of interest and to identify possible 
mitigating measures. This work is due to report by the end of 2012.246 
195. A number of witnesses suggested that it was likely that the review would conclude that 
there were conflicts of interest. This was because the new role would give National Grid 
access to privileged information, which could be used to further its own commercial 
interests.247 
196. While witnesses welcomed the fact that the Government is reviewing potential 
conflicts of interest, some problems with the timetable for the review were identified. Some 
witnesses believed that the review was too early because there is not yet enough 
information about what the precise role of the SO as the EMR delivery body will be.248 
Others, on the other hand, felt it was too late because National Grid will need to begin 
collecting data for the Delivery Plan this summer, before any safeguards have been put in 
place.249 
197. National Grid and DECC were confident that any conflicts of interest could be 
managed by applying business separation rules with oversight from Ofgem.250 Nick Winser 
(Executive Director, National Grid) argued that this would not be a challenge for the 
company because there are already parts of National Grid that operate in this way. He said: 
For example, we would expect the information that we get for EMR to only be used 
for EMR. We would expect, and are very likely to have, a data restriction on keeping 
that information just for purposes of EMR. There are all sorts of requirements on us 
in this area; it is part of our business, and we are used to managing it.251  
198. We do not believe that it is appropriate for a private company—which is ultimately 
motivated by profit making—to act as the EMR delivery body. DECC’s proposals for 
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the System Operator to take on this role will result in considerable conflicts of interest 
for National Grid and could result in unnecessary additional costs to consumers. We 
recommend that National Grid should be removed from this role and replaced by 
establishing a new independent, not for profit company. 
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7 Emissions Performance Standard 
199. We have expressed our dissatisfaction with the Government’s proposals for an 
Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) on numerous previous occasions.252 We still 
believe that introducing the measure as currently designed would be pointless and would 
merely add complexity to an already overly-complicated package of reforms. 
200. In this section, we highlight new factors that have emerged during the course of our 
pre-legislative scrutiny. We do not rehearse the arguments made in our previous reports. 
We refer interested readers to our previous inquiries on Emissions Performance Standards, 
Electricity Market Reform and Energy Security.253 
Grandfathering 
201. The principle of grandfathering means that once a fossil fuelled power plant receives 
building consent under a particular emissions limit, the plant will not be affected by any 
subsequent changes to that level for a pre-determined period. After an “informal 
consultation”, DECC announced in March this year that the initial EPS of 450g/kWh 
would be grandfathered until 2045. 254 This initial EPS will itself be reviewed in 2015. 
202. Energy companies told us that these grandfathering arrangements were necessary to 
bring forward investment in new gas-fired generation.255 However, environmental 
organisations believed that the 30 year grandfathering period risked locking the UK into a 
high-carbon electricity system.256 This echoed the comments made by the Chair of the 
Committee on Climate Change in a letter to the Secretary of State earlier this year that 
while the EPS proposal “could be compatible with power sector decarbonisation 
requirements to meet carbon budgets, [it] also carries the risk that there will be too much 
gas-fired generation instead of low carbon investment”.257 
203. Simon Skillings (E3G) warned that if the EPS was grandfathered until 2045, the only 
lever available to future governments to regulate emissions from unabated gas-fired plant 
would be the carbon price. He said: 
If you throw away that lever [an EPS that affects gas], you could end up in the 
situation where we have a hugely inefficient vehicle to drive this investment, which is 
a very, very, very high carbon price—and it will need to be very, very high. Germany 
[…] has exactly this problem. It has lots of coal on the system, and it doesn’t matter 
how much renewables it subsidises on the system; if the carbon price stays at low 
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levels, the coal is going to be pumping it out. It can’t get rid of the carbon. This is 
where an emissions performance standard provides another tool, and we are going to 
face that situation with gas plant as we go through the 2020s.258 
204. The Government’s intention to review the EPS in 2015 is another source of 
uncertainty for investors. It may even cause a “dash for gas” itself, if investors rush to 
build gas plant before the review. We are concerned that DECC’s decision to 
grandfather the EPS until 2045 is not compatible with our long-term decarbonisation 
objectives. If too much new unabated gas-fired plant comes forward under these 
arrangements, future governments could be faced with a tough decision either to miss 
the carbon budgets or to set an extremely high carbon price, which would ultimately 
increase costs to consumers. We recommend that a shorter grandfathering period 
commensurate with decarbonising the electricity system by 2030 should be adopted. 
Exemption for carbon capture and storage 
205. The Government intends to exempt projects that form part of the UK Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) Programme on a case-by-case basis. The draft Bill defines 
stations that are eligible for exemption as “a generating station at which carbon capture 
and storage technology is or is to be, or has been, used in commercial electricity generation 
for the purposes of or in connection with a CCS demonstration project”.259 
206. Witnesses from environmental NGOs warned that new partial CCS plants could still 
produce significant greenhouse gas emissions.260 The RSPB and WWF provided an 
example: “the proposed 1852MW coal plant in Hunterston, Scotland, would emit 587-
650gCO2/kWh, and emissions from year one would be equivalent to adding 63% to 
Scotland’s annual power sector emissions”.261 The NGOs concluded that the CCS 
exemption could undermine decarbonisation ambitions.262 The CBI believed that the CCS 
exemptions were necessary to avoid undermining the development of CCS technology.263 
207. CCS is a special case and it is important not to risk delaying or undermining the 
development of the technology. But DECC should ensure that the Bill provides 
sufficient safeguards so as to avoid the unintended consequence of undermining 
decarbonisation. There may be merit in the inclusion of a minimum proportion of 
emissions to be captured by CCS plants in clause. 37 
Parliamentary Procedure 
208. The Secretary of State will have the power to exempt plant from the EPS in the case 
that he or she thought there were security of supply concerns.264 According to DECC’s 
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Delegated Powers Memorandum on the draft Energy Bill, this decision would be an 
“executive act” and therefore would not be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, although the 
draft Bill does provide for on Order under this section to be laid before Parliament after it 
has been made.  
209. We believe that any decision to exempt plant from the EPS on energy security 
grounds should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, even if this scrutiny has to be 
retrospective. 
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8 Timetable for delivery 
210. The Committee has previously emphasised the importance of timely delivery of the 
reforms. The White Paper stated “we intend that this legislation will reach the statue book 
by spring 2013”.265 The indicative roadmap in the draft Bill shows that the timetable has 
already slipped, with Royal Assent now expected in the fourth quarter of 2013 (which 
would require the bill to be carried-over from one parliamentary session to the next).266 
The Secretary of State confirmed to us that he expected Royal Assent at the end of calendar 
2013 “at the latest”.267 However, we see no reason why, if introduced swiftly in the autumn 
as planned, the Bill could not reach the statute book by May 2013.  
211. We are concerned that the uncompleted work in designing CfDs and the capacity 
market, combined with the need to gain state aid clearance, could lead to further delays in 
the timetable.268 This would have serious consequences for meeting our 2020 renewables 
and security of supply objectives. In order to prevent this from happening, it may be 
necessary to consider pushing back the closing date for the RO (currently planned for 
2017), for example to 2020, to reflect any slippage in the EMR programme. 269 We 
note that an extension of the RO to enable slippage to be accommodated would not 
compromise the government’s intention to combine underwriting for all low carbon 
technologies, since the date of 2018 as the year in which new nuclear power comes on 
stream has already slipped substantially. 
212. We heard particular concerns about the impact of uncertainty on offshore wind. The 
Combined Heat and Power Association told us: 
The uncertainty over the EMR means that large scale renewables investments such as 
Round Three offshore wind projects are now on hold as they cannot be sure of 
commissioning before the 2017 date when the current support regime (the 
Renewables Obligation) will close to new entrants. For these projects the lack of 
certainty surrounding the CfD FiT combined with uncertainty over the timing of 
offshore transmission infrastructure development means that large developers and 
banks will not risk funding the development of a project, which, if not commissioned 
by 2017, has no certainty over its CfD revenue stream and its value.  
213. Delivery according to timetable is crucial if we are to meet our climate change and 
renewables targets and retain security of supply for 2020. We are extremely concerned 
that DECC’s delivery timetable has already slipped, and that there is still a great deal of 
work that needs to be done to finalise the legislation. In addition, there is a risk that 
state aid clearance will delay the implementation of the new support measures. If 
questions about CfDs are not resolved swiftly, there is a real risk that new low-carbon 
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projects in the pipeline will dry up, potentially jeopardising our 2020 targets. The 
Government must ensure that there are no further delays to the Bill and should aim for 
its formal passage in Parliament to be completed before the end of the current Session. 
If delays do occur, it may be necessary to delay closure of the RO in order to reflect 
slower progress in finalising the details of EMR. 
Is a backup plan needed? 
214. Given the major questions that still need to be resolved about the CfD mechanism, 
several witnesses suggested that it would be wise to have a backup option in case some of 
the problems proved insoluble. SSE, along with several independent suppliers said that a 
PFiT needed to remain an option in the Bill.270 WWF-UK called for other FiT options to be 
left open in the Bill, to allow for further flexibility should CfD be shown not to be the most 
suitable option for some or all renewables.271 Others believed that the RO might need to be 
extended on a long-term basis.272 
215. However, most witnesses were keen to get the proposals right first time and hoped 
that alternative options would not be necessary.273 Dr Kennedy of the Committee on 
Climate Change told us: 
[Extending the RO] would have to be plan B, I think, but plan A is to get this set of 
arrangements right to make them such that they bring forward investment in 
renewables, and then you don’t need to extend the renewables obligation. I think if 
we get it wrong, if we delay with the legislation, if we delay with the implementing 
arrangements or if we don’t get the implementing arrangements right so that we 
have too much risk with the investor, you may then want to extend the renewables 
obligation, but that would be a bad thing. We have the opportunity to get EMR 
right.274 
216. We do not believe that a backup plan is necessary at this stage. However, if DECC 
does not resolve the outstanding questions regarding the CfD payment model, 
allocation of CfDs and routes to market before the autumn, it may be necessary to 
consider keeping open the option to extend the RO and/or convert it into a PFiT. 
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9 Wider concerns about the draft Bill 
Political leadership in communicating costs 
217. As we noted in our previous report on EMR and our forthcoming report on the 
UNFCCC, a failure to communicate with the electorate about the fact that electricity prices 
are likely to increase in future may undermine the credibility of the entire EMR package 
and stifle action that consumers would otherwise take to improve energy efficiency, in 
order to keep bills down.275 (It is likely that prices will increase in the short-term even 
without action to decarbonise because global demand for gas is pushing up prices.)  
218. This theme was raised during our roundtable meeting with investors and analysts. 
One participant said “There is a need for political leadership. If Government wants 
investors we need to see the Government standing behind its decisions and to have a 
discussion with citizens about proposals for the energy sector. If the discussion is fair and 
open we will trust their word is true. If not we will put you in the same box as the European 
bailout countries – we won’t believe what you say”.276  
219. Investors are concerned that a failure to engage properly with members of the public 
now creates the possibility of a backlash from consumers at some point in the future. This 
could result in a future government reneging on commitments (as has happened recently 
in Spain). Although the purpose of using long-term contracts rather than a Feed-in Tariff 
is to make it more difficult for future governments to renege on commitments made now, 
adding an additional layer of certainty by specifying what compensation might be available 
in the case of the CfD being dismantled at some point in the future would help to increase 
certainty for investors. 
220. Some investors are concerned that there may not be sufficient acceptance among 
members of the public for the EMR proposals to be delivered successfully. There is 
therefore a fear that a future Government may renege on commitments as a result of 
political pressure from the electorate. his is driven by the perception in some quarters 
that the Government is failing to warn consumers about likely increases in electricity 
prices. In order to increase confidence, DECC should spell out the provisions for 
recompense should the CfD be dismantled as the result of circumstances beyond its 
control. 
Clarity about the future role of gas 
221. As we have noted previously, there is a delicate balance to be struck between ensuring 
there is sufficient gas capacity on the system to meet short-term security of supply 
objectives on the one hand, and preventing “lock-in” to a high-carbon system that does not 
achieve our long-term decarbonisation objectives on the other.277 
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222. It is not clear what the impact of the EMR proposals will be on the delivery of new 
gas-fired generating capacity or the extent to which it will be used in the future. For 
example, some witnesses told us that uncertainty may cause a hiatus in investment, while 
others told us that the EPS grandfathering proposals could encourage a rush of new build 
ahead of the 2015 review date (see paragraphs 177 - 183). It appears that there is the 
potential for different measures within the EMR package to pull in different directions and 
it is not yet clear which will prevail. WWF said: 
We believe that the EPS and the capacity mechanism need to be looked at together as 
an integrated package of measures, the combined aim of which should be to ensure 
that the (i) UK has sufficient flexible peaking capacity to meet demand in 2030 and 
(ii) has sufficient safeguards in place to ensure that the generation mix in place by 
2030 will comply with a carbon intensity target of 50gCO2/kWh.278 
223. It is vital to have a clearer understanding of the likely impact of the EMR proposals 
on the future role for gas. We hope that the Government’s forthcoming Gas Strategy 
will provide clarity about both the Government’s vision for the role of gas in the 
electricity system, and how the EMR proposals will deliver this in practice. There would 
be merit in assessing the combined impact of the capacity market and Emissions 
Performance Standard on energy security and climate change objectives. We 
recommend that DECC conducts modelling work before introducing the Bill to 
investigate the combined impact of the capacity market and EPS on emissions and 
security outcomes under different scenarios. This should include “dash for gas before 
2015” scenario and a “no new gas before 2015” scenario.  
The Bill has the potential to damage low-carbon jobs and industries 
224. The Secretary of State told us that he believed the Bill would help to create growth and 
would generate “about a quarter of a million” new jobs.279 We also hope to see growth in 
the number of “green” jobs, but several witnesses told us that the proposals as they stand 
might damage the prospects for developing new manufacturing and supply chain 
industries. There was particular concern about the impact on industries associated with 
wave and tidal energy.280 
225. The two main areas of concern were the proposals to move to auctioning of CfDs for 
renewable energy in 2017 and the lack of clarity about the strike price for marine energy 
after 2017. Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman (Exeter University) told us that the 
proposals for auctioning were “reminiscent of the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation from 1990-
1998 […] – an unsuccessful mechanism for a variety of reasons, which also destroyed the 
British wind manufacturing base because the level of competition was so great that cheaper 
overseas turbines were used”.281 Aquamarine Power asked “what incentive is there for 
companies to invest in the £10s of millions required to support the first marine energy 
arrays in the run up to 2017, without a clear idea there will be a clear and consistent market 
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for these technologies in the decades ahead?”.282 Auctioning of CfDs was explored in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
Re-regulation of the energy system 
226. Although the Government is committed to a competitive market for electricity, in 
practice the proposed reforms will deliver a significant level of government intervention in 
the market.283 For example, nuclear and renewables will fall under the CfD regime, 
unabated coal will be ruled out by the EPS and new gas capacity may end up in the capacity 
market. Greenpeace noted that “thus all forms of power generation will be receiving direct 
support”.284 
227. What is more, some witnesses told us that limiting the availability of CfDs under the 
levy cap would mean that choices will have to be made about which projects gain support. 
This means that in practice, the CfD awarding body will be making decisions about the 
nature of Great Britain’s generation mix. Climate Change Capital told us: 
In our view none of the allocation mechanisms proposed either work or absolve 
DECC from needing to make qualitative judgements as to who they will award CfDs 
to. […] In the (highly likely) event that the number of consented projects exceeds the 
available approved levy spend, then this means that the allocation body will need to 
make qualitative judgements as to which projects will achieve financing and hence 
should be awarded CfDs. We simply do not see any way around this.285 
228. The Secretary of State did not accept this argument because “after 2017, […] there is 
going to be a competition for who gets the Contracts for Difference”.286  
A proper assessment of costs 
229. The cost of capital offered by banks and other financial investors will determine 
whether projects to build new generation capacity are viable. The cost of capital is 
determined by the level of risk associated with the projects. The Government’s rationale for 
introducing Contracts for Difference (CfDs) is that they will reduce risk by improving 
long-term revenue certainty, which will lower the cost of capital for low-carbon 
generators.287  
230. However, while witnesses agreed that the Government was right to aim to reduce the 
cost of capital, they also suggested that the current proposals were likely to introduce new 
risks, which could undermine any savings achieved through reduced revenue risk. These 
included: 
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• Risks associated with the proposed counterparty model, which is “new, complex and 
has no clear legal precedent”. The creditworthiness of the counterparty and legal 
enforceability of contracts were cited as particular concerns. 288 (see Chapter 3) 
• Development risk resulting from the levy cap and use of auctions (see Chapter 3).289 
SSE pointed out that “since development is almost entirely funded by higher cost 
equity, increasing development risk will significantly impact adversely on overall 
financing costs”.290 
• The potential for downgrading of credit ratings across the suppliers as a result of the 
counterparty arrangements, which would lead to an increase in borrowing costs for all 
of these organisations.291(see paragraph 85) 
• Risks associated with the inclusion of contract term penalties in CfDs.292 
• The introduction of basis risk (that the generator may not achieve the market reference 
price) that does not exist with the Renewables Obligation.293 (see paragraphs 118-119) 
• The overall complexity of the proposals increases risk.294 
• Transaction costs (such as credit and collateral requirements etc) are not considered. 
231. In addition, the EMR proposals focus entirely on reducing revenue risk in order to 
attract new sources of finance, when in fact, other types of risk might be more influential in 
determining investment decisions. For example, pension funds would not be willing to 
take offshore wind construction risk, family office and private equity funds would be 
unlikely to fund projects costing more than €20 million and only utility companies would 
be likely to take on nuclear construction risk. This suggests a lack of proper understanding 
within DECC about how financing decisions are made by different types of financial 
institution. 
232. We recommended in paragraph 102 that DECC should develop a more robust Impact 
Assessment methodology to account for these different types of risk. 
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10 Conclusion 
233. Reform of the electricity market is necessary to deliver new investment in low-carbon 
energy that will help to meet our climate and energy security objectives. It is disappointing 
that so many of the recommendations made in our previous report on this subject have not 
been adopted.295 It is not clear that the proposals as they stand will succeed in attracting 
new sources of finance. Nor is it clear that they will minimise costs to consumers. However, 
there is still time to rescue the package and to develop a coherent, workable package of 
reforms. 
234. Despite having published a White Paper a year ago, there is still a large amount of 
detail that DECC needs to finalise before the Bill is introduced. This includes important 
terms of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) that are key to their operation (such as length of 
contract and what the strike price will be) as well as the crucial question of what the 
payment model will look like and who the counterparty will be. What is more, important 
evidence on demand reduction and access to market for independent generators was still 
being collected by DECC during our inquiry and it is completely unsatisfactory that this 
work was not completed in time to be published alongside the draft Bill. A speedy 
conclusion to all of these outstanding aspects is essential and DECC should introduce its 
Bill as soon as possible in the autumn, with a view to reaching Royal Assent by the end of 
the current Session. 
235. The proposal to introduce CfDs to support investment in low-carbon generation is 
the cornerstone to the legislation. Without a working support system, we will have little 
chance of meeting our energy system objectives. The problems that have been identified 
with the proposed model raise serious concerns and it is clear that the proposals as they 
stand are unlikely to be workable in practice. DECC must focus its efforts on addressing 
the design flaws before introducing the Bill. If they are not resolved, policy credibility will 
be damaged and investor confidence seriously undermined.  
236. Government must also pay particular regard to key omissions and unintended 
consequences that have been identified through the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill. 
These include the lack of specific objectives, the lack of consideration of demand-side 
measures and the potential for the reforms to lead to more vertical integration in the 
energy system. 
237. The perceived conflict between DECC and HM Treasury on some aspects of EMR is 
also contributing to uncertainty among the investor community. We sincerely hope that 
these two departments can in future develop a better working relationship than they have 
demonstrated to us during the course of our inquiry. We hope that all departments will 
present a clear, consistent and united message as the Bill passes through the House. 
  
 
295 Energy and Climate Change Committee, Electricity Market Reform [Fourth Report, Session 2010-12, HC 742]  
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Recommendations 
1. We recommend that in order to increase confidence and ensure that there is an 
opportunity for rigorous Parliamentary scrutiny, the Government should publish 
draft secondary legislation, including a model Contract for Difference, in time for 
formal consideration of the Bill. (Paragraph 26) 
2. We note that despite the Secretary of State’s assertion that the objectives of the Bill 
were clear, they are not set out formally on the face of the Bill. (Paragraph 29) 
3. We welcome the Secretary of State’s clarification that if faced with a choice between 
meeting legal climate change obligations and sticking within the levy cap, the 
Government would give primacy to statutory climate obligations. The investment 
community would have been further reassured had HM Treasury been able to 
confirm this. Because HM Treasury have told us that DECC spoke for all of 
Government in its evidence, we consider this a cast iron commitment to the primacy 
of statutory obligations over the Levy Control Framework. We would welcome an 
explanation from HM Treasury about how the working of the levy cap over the 
forthcoming funding period will be amended to make it compatible with the 
requirement to meet legal climate change obligations. (Paragraph 32) 
4. It is right to prioritise the decarbonisation of the electricity system because this is 
likely to deliver the most cost effective route to meeting our 2050 climate change 
targets. Although statutory carbon reduction targets are set out in the Climate 
Change Act 2008, these are economy wide, rather than sector specific. We conclude 
that providing greater clarity about the contribution that the power sector is expected 
to make towards meeting these targets would help to provide certainty to investors. 
The Government should set a 2030 carbon intensity target for the electricity sector in 
secondary legislation based on the recommendation of the Committee on Climate 
Change. (Paragraph 37) 
5. We recommend that the Committee on Climate Change should be made a statutory 
consultee to the EMR delivery plan in order to assess whether the proposals are in 
line with legally binding carbon budgets. (Paragraph 38) 
6. We further recommend that the Committee on Climate Change should be given a 
role in advising whoever is the Transmission System Operator in the development of 
the delivery plan to ensure that it is in line with legally binding carbon budgets. 
(Paragraph 39) 
7. We recommend that Clause 1, subsection (1) of the Bill be amended to read “The 
Secretary of State may make regulations about contracts for difference for the 
purpose of encouraging low carbon electricity generation in order to achieve legally 
binding carbon budgets at least possible cost to consumers”. (Paragraph 43) 
8. We recommend that Clause 8, subsection (2) be amended to add “[…] (d) a 2030 
target for carbon intensity of the electricity sector compatible with meeting statutory 
carbon budgets and the 2050 target (e) a reliability standard”. We believe that setting 
a decarbonisation target should be a duty on the Secretary of State. However, the 
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current wording of Clause 8 (the Secretary of State “may” by order provide for […]) 
suggests that the introduction of “other targets” would be at the Secretary of State’s 
discretion. Therefore we recommend that the Bill be amended to make this a 
statutory obligation within a fixed timeframe, possibly by way of further amendment 
to Clause 8. We note that a carbon intensity of the order of around 50gCO2/kWh by 
2030 is compatible with legally binding carbon budgets. (Paragraph 44) 
9. We recommend that Clause 9, subsection (1) be amended to add “[…] (e) the 
Committee on Climate Change […]” and that Clause 44, subsection (4) be amended 
to add “(d) the Committee on Climate Change”.  (Paragraph 45) 
10. We recommend that Clause 20, subsection (1) of the Bill be amended to read “The 
Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the purpose of providing 
capacity to meet the demands of consumers for the supply of electricity in Great 
Britain, while achieving legally binding carbon budgets at least possible cost to 
consumers” (Paragraph 46) 
11. We recommend that the long title should be amended to read “Make provision for 
contracts for difference and investment instruments in connection with encouraging 
low carbon electricity generation in order to achieve legally binding carbon budgets 
and provide security of supply at least cost to consumers […]”. We recommend that 
the long title should be further amended to delete “contracts for difference” and 
insert “support mechanisms”. (Paragraph 47) 
12. The draft Bill and its associated documents are fundamentally flawed by the lack of 
consideration given to demand-side measures, which are potentially the cheapest 
methods of decarbonising our electricity system. Responsive demand features only to 
a limited extent in the proposed capacity market, a subject we discuss in Chapter 5. 
Reducing overall demand, meanwhile, is entirely absent from the Bill. Indeed, the 
Secretary of State admitted to us that “there is a lot of work we should be doing and 
are doing on that”. We recommended, over a year ago, that “demand reduction 
should be placed at the heart of EMR”. It is completely unsatisfactory that DECC’s 
work was not completed in time to be published alongside the draft Bill. This 
suggests that DECC is still failing to give enough priority to ensuring that demand-
side measures contribute to our energy policy goals. We are concerned that adding 
last-minute measures to an already pre-determined structure of a Bill may severely 
limit what can be achieved on demand reduction and management through EMR.  
(Paragraph 50) 
13. We note that DECC’s draft report on capturing the full electricity efficiency potential 
of the UK identified approximately 155TWh of demand reduction potential in 2030 
(which represents around 40% of total demand). Of this potential, current policy is 
estimated to capture only around 35%. We recommend that permanent end-use 
reduction in electricity demand should feature much more prominently in the Bill in 
order to realise some of the remaining 65% savings. (Paragraph 51) 
14. We note the publication of DECC’s draft report on capturing the full electricity 
efficiency potential of the UK and recommend that measures to encourage 
permanent end-use reduction in electricity demand are included in the Bill.  We 
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recommend an amendment to the draft Bill to provide the Secretary of State with 
powers to introduce a Feed In Tariff for energy efficiency, if this cannot be achieved 
through existing legislation. The Bill should also include stronger measures to 
encourage flexible, responsive demand, as we discuss in more detail in later 
recommendations.  (Paragraph 58) 
15. The EMR provisions as they stand are likely to undermine Ofgem’s efforts to 
increase competition in the wholesale markets. We therefore recommend that the 
Government amend its current proposals to avoid the likelihood that they will lead 
to more- not less- vertical integration and consolidation in the market. (See Chapter 
3). (Paragraph 64) 
16. The Coalition Agreement states that “We will encourage community-owned 
renewable energy schemes where local people benefit from the power produced”. 
However, the Renewable Obligation has not delivered community-owned schemes 
and the proposed CfDs are also unlikely to work for community schemes. A simple 
Fixed Feed-in Tariff would be a more appropriate form of support. We therefore 
recommend that this Bill provides for the Energy Act 2008 to be amended to allow 
for the eligibility threshold for small-scale FiTs to be extended to at least 10MW and 
potentially up to 50MW in size. (Paragraph 70) 
17. We consider that suggestions that small suppliers might be exempted partially or 
wholly from obligations to post collateral have merit and recommend that the 
Government takes steps to ensure that small suppliers are not disadvantaged. 
(Paragraph 87) 
18. We recommend that the Government abandons the multiparty concept and reverts 
to a single counterparty payment model, with a contract and counterparty design 
that is legally enforceable.  (Paragraph 94) 
19. The main purpose of the reforms was to reduce the cost of capital for investors. The 
nature of the counterparty will affect the cost of capital (see paragraph 97). In our 
view, a counterparty model that is underwritten by Government would be the best 
way to instil investor confidence and reduce financing costs. (Paragraph 95) 
20. DECC must fully assess the implications of a single counterparty without 
government underwriting on suppliers’ balance sheets and on the cost of capital 
before adoption of this model. This should include an assessment of what impact this 
model would have on smaller suppliers to ensure that this counterparty model would 
not threaten the viability of these businesses. (Paragraph 96) 
21. We believe that the nature of the counterparty will have an impact on the cost of 
capital. DECC’s claim that the nature of the counterparty would not affect the 
outcome of the Impact Assessment (IA) merely reflects the lack of sophistication in 
the original assessment, rather than the likely real-world impact on the cost of 
capital.  (Paragraph 99) 
22. DECC must update its methodology as well as the figures when revising the Impact 
Assessment (IA). The model needs to reflect real world approaches to capital pricing 
and should incorporate the impact of new risks on the cost of capital (including 
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counterparty risk, development risk, risks to credit ratings and basis risk). The IA 
should specifically address the issue of how Government-underwriting (or lack 
thereof) of the CfD counterparty affects investor risks and costs.  (Paragraph 102) 
23. Rationing the number of CfDs under the levy cap increases development risk. We 
recommend that DECC introduces a two-step or pre-registration process to give 
developers greater confidence that they will be able to obtain a CfD before reaching 
Final Investment Decision. (Paragraph 109) 
24. The Government should clarify what will be defined as falling within the Levy 
Control Framework at an early date.  (Paragraph 112) 
25. It is essential that the Government makes clear how choices will be made by the 
agent allocating contracts, in particular in allocation between technologies. We 
recommend that reporting against the delivery plan should include details of 
commitments already entered into at FIDs or during FID-enabling discussions, and 
is transparent to other players in order to assist long term planning (Paragraph 113) 
26. We recommend that in order to provide greater confidence to developers, 
Government should set out (a) the level of the funding that will be available under 
the Levy Control Framework until 2020, (b) whether the present rules on headroom 
will remain as they are or will be amended to provide more flexibility for levy 
allocation over the next spending period; and (c) whether the present mechanism of 
capping expenditure annually and longitudinally by line will be maintained or 
relaxed during the next spending period. We note the Committee on Climate 
Change’s suggestion that funding available under the Levy Control Framework until 
2020 should be around £8 billion in 2020. (Paragraph 115) 
27. Auctions may be useful but they are not the only means to secure cost reduction. We 
recommend that DECC should learn from experiences overseas and consider setting 
out a planned reduction pathway for strike prices. This would guarantee a reduction 
in the level of subsidy paid by consumers over time. (Paragraph 117) 
28. Access to market for independent generators under the CfD arrangements is an 
extremely serious issue that must be resolved before a Bill can be introduced. We 
recommend that DECC expedites its review of evidence on access to the electricity 
market for renewable generators to ensure that a solution to this issue is identified 
before the Bill is introduced to Parliament in the “autumn”.  (Paragraph 124) 
29. We recommend that as part of its review of access to market for independent 
generators, DECC should examine the following options: introducing a buyer of last 
resort; introducing an incentive for suppliers to source energy from low-carbon 
generation; extending the micro-gen FiT to projects up to 50MW in size; and 
holding open the RO for new entrants in the event that the PPA market disappears. 
(Paragraph 128) 
30. We are concerned that the proposed process for setting the nuclear strike price lacks 
sufficient transparency. The perception that decisions are being made “behind closed 
doors” could be highly damaging to the low-carbon agenda and may further 
undermine consumer trust in energy companies. It is essential that the negotiations 
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deliver, and are perceived to deliver, value for money to consumers. We recommend 
that an independent panel of experts should be appointed to oversee the negotiations 
and to report to Parliament on the adequacy of the outcome and value for money for 
consumers. (Paragraph 134) 
31.  Since there is little competitive pressure or prospect of moving to auctions for new 
nuclear, we are concerned that the strike price for nuclear could be driven upwards. 
We hope that industry claims that the cost of nuclear is competitive with other forms 
of low-carbon energy will be reflected in the offers they put forward during strike 
price negotiations. We do not believe that a nuclear strike price higher than that 
given to offshore wind would represent good value for money to the consumer. The 
Secretary of State should not agree to contracts of this nature.  (Paragraph 136) 
32. Government should provide clarity on the strike price level beyond 2017 as soon as 
possible in order to provide certainty and help secure investment for emerging 
technologies, such as wave and tidal power. (Paragraph 139) 
33. We conclude that state aid as well as political considerations have influenced the 
design of the CfD package, and have caused policy and financial support for nuclear 
to be rolled up with that for renewables. Logic suggests that the Government should 
differentiate nuclear from other low-carbon technologies within an overall FiT 
regime. The Committee will consider further the building of new nuclear and its 
associated challenges later in the year. (Paragraph 145) 
34. Given that the Government (and the Committee on Climate Change) see nuclear 
playing a key role in the future energy mix, Government should consider how 
carbon and security objectives could be delivered if no new nuclear is forthcoming.  
(Paragraph 146) 
35. We share the concerns of many witnesses about the transparency of the FID-
enabling process. Hinkley C is the first project to be considered under the process. 
We recommend that DECC ensures that any contract terms agreed are published as 
soon as possible. We also recommend that, as with setting strike prices under the 
CfD mechanism, an independent panel of experts should be appointed to oversee the 
investment instrument negotiations, and should report to Parliament on value for 
money for consumers (see paragraph 134). (Paragraph 153) 
36. The deferral of a firm decision to implement a capacity market creates uncertainty 
and risks a hiatus in investment. The Energy Bill should be based on a clear 
Government position on the circumstances in which a market will be introduced, 
and how this will be reviewed and updated over time. The Government should set 
out an enduring reliability standard, which, along with a decarbonisation target for 
electricity, would provide a clear framework for the System Operator to work within 
when operating a capacity market. (Paragraph 164) 
37. We are extremely concerned that the capacity market proposals are based upon out-
dated assumptions and an insufficient analysis of the future risks to reliability. We 
recommend that the Government undertakes much clearer analysis of the problem 
that the capacity market is trying to solve, particularly the integration of the large 
volume of intermittent generation that is likely to be required to decarbonise our 
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electricity supplies, and of the role capacity payments can play in furthering demand 
side response and reduction measures. The enabling legislation in the Energy Bill 
must be able to meet our future reliability challenges. (Paragraph 171) 
38. We recognise that a more thorough assessment of cost-effectiveness must await the 
publication of detailed capacity market proposals. DECC should conduct further 
analysis on the costs of the capacity market to ensure it is not significantly higher 
than alternative options such as a strategic reserve. The Government should clarify 
how the Energy Bill will ensure that the capacity delivered by auctions will have the 
appropriate characteristics, such as flexibility, and how this relates to the System 
Operator’s existing system balancing role, in order to ensure that costs are 
minimised.  (Paragraph 175) 
39. As we recommend in paragraph 223, it is vital to have an understanding of the likely 
impact of EMR of the future role for gas generation. DECC should conduct 
modelling work to assess the combined impact of the capacity market and the EPS 
on emissions and security outcomes under different scenarios. This should include 
both a “dash for gas before 2015” scenario and a “no new gas before 2015” scenario 
(Paragraph 183) 
40. We recommend that the Government, in its forthcoming Gas Strategy, considers the 
interrelationship between electricity market reform and the capabilities of the gas 
infrastructure, in particular the potential need for more gas storage. (Paragraph 184) 
41. As innovative technologies, demand-side response and storage technologies should 
be recognised and defined explicitly in the Energy Bill. Support for innovation is 
given to the supply-side, for example by the banding of the Renewables Obligation, 
and the Bill should provide similar support to demand-side and storage technologies. 
DECC should investigate the legislative and other barriers to storage identified by 
our witnesses, and remove any that prevent it from competing fairly in the market. 
(Paragraph 191) 
42. The Government should clarify how the capacity market will be made compatible 
with increased interconnection and the move to a more integrated European 
electricity market. (Paragraph 193) 
43. We do not believe that it is appropriate for a private company—which is ultimately 
motivated by profit making—to act as the EMR delivery body. DECC’s proposals for 
the System Operator to take on this role will result in considerable conflicts of 
interest for National Grid and could result in unnecessary additional costs to 
consumers. We recommend that National Grid should be removed from this role 
and replaced by establishing a new independent, not for profit company. (Paragraph 
198) 
44. The Government’s intention to review the EPS in 2015 is another source of 
uncertainty for investors. It may even cause a “dash for gas” itself, if investors rush to 
build gas plant before the review. We are concerned that DECC’s decision to 
grandfather the EPS until 2045 is not compatible with our long-term decarbonisation 
objectives. If too much new unabated gas-fired plant comes forward under these 
arrangements, future governments could be faced with a tough decision either to 
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miss the carbon budgets or to set an extremely high carbon price, which would 
ultimately increase costs to consumers. We recommend that a shorter 
grandfathering period commensurate with decarbonising the electricity system by 
2030 should be adopted. (Paragraph 204) 
45. CCS is a special case and it is important not to risk delaying or undermining the 
development of the technology. But DECC should ensure that the Bill provides 
sufficient safeguards so as to avoid the unintended consequence of undermining 
decarbonisation. There may be merit in the inclusion of a minimum proportion of 
emissions to be captured by CCS plants in clause. 37 (Paragraph 207) 
46. We believe that any decision to exempt plant from the EPS on energy security 
grounds should be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, even if this scrutiny has to be 
retrospective. (Paragraph 209) 
47. In order to prevent this from happening, it may be necessary to consider pushing 
back the closing date for the RO (currently planned for 2017), for example to 2020, 
to reflect any slippage in the EMR programme.  We note that an extension of the RO 
to enable slippage to be accommodated would not compromise the government’s 
intention to combine underwriting for all low carbon technologies, since the date of 
2018 as the year in which new nuclear power comes on stream has already slipped 
substantially. (Paragraph 211) 
48. Delivery according to timetable is crucial if we are to meet our climate change and 
renewables targets and retain security of supply for 2020. We are extremely 
concerned that DECC’s delivery timetable has already slipped, and that there is still a 
great deal of work that needs to be done to finalise the legislation. In addition, there 
is a risk that state aid clearance will delay the implementation of the new support 
measures. If questions about CfDs are not resolved swiftly, there is a real risk that 
new low-carbon projects in the pipeline will dry up, potentially jeopardising our 
2020 targets. The Government must ensure that there are no further delays to the Bill 
and should aim for its formal passage in Parliament to be completed before the end 
of the current Session. If delays do occur, it may be necessary to delay closure of the 
RO in order to reflect slower progress in finalising the details of EMR. (Paragraph 
213) 
49. We do not believe that a backup plan is necessary at this stage. However, if DECC 
does not resolve the outstanding questions regarding the CfD payment model, 
allocation of CfDs and routes to market before the autumn, it may be necessary to 
consider keeping open the option to extend the RO and/or convert it into a PFiT. 
(Paragraph 216) 
50. Some investors are concerned that there may not be sufficient acceptance among 
members of the public for the EMR proposals to be delivered successfully. There is 
therefore a fear that a future Government may renege on commitments as a result of 
political pressure from the electorate. his is driven by the perception in some quarters 
that the Government is failing to warn consumers about likely increases in electricity 
prices. In order to increase confidence, DECC should spell out the provisions for 
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recompense should the CfD be dismantled as the result of circumstances beyond its 
control. (Paragraph 220) 
51. It is vital to have a clearer understanding of the likely impact of the EMR proposals 
on the future role for gas. We hope that the Government’s forthcoming Gas Strategy 
will provide clarity about both the Government’s vision for the role of gas in the 
electricity system, and how the EMR proposals will deliver this in practice. There 
would be merit in assessing the combined impact of the capacity market and 
Emissions Performance Standard on energy security and climate change objectives. 
We recommend that DECC conducts modelling work before introducing the Bill to 
investigate the combined impact of the capacity market and EPS on emissions and 
security outcomes under different scenarios. This should include “dash for gas before 
2015” scenario and a “no new gas before 2015” scenario.  (Paragraph 223) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny 
 
 
 Annex 1: Note from roundtable meeting 
The Committee held a roundtable discussion with representatives from financial 
institutions on 25 June 2012. Participants represented a range of different types of 
organisation, including large collective investment schemes, commercial banks, private 
equity and infrastructure fund managers, and analysts.  
The aim of the meeting was to explore some of the likely impacts of the Electricity Market 
Reform proposals in the Draft Energy Bill on investment decisions and to gain a better 
understanding of what changes (if any) would be required to secure the levels of 
investment that are needed to meet our low-carbon and energy security objectives. 
The discussion covered a wide range of topics. A summary of the key points is given 
below. 
 
Are the current proposals investable? 
“I have not spoken to a single other investor who thought that the publication of the 
draft Bill was a positive step forward.” 
“The policy is on its way to a train wreck.” 
“There is an assumption that £100 billion will be invested in the UK. Where will this 
come from? […] This question of where the money will come from has not come 
close to being addressed.” 
 
Participants agreed that the EMR proposals in their current form were uninvestable. Two 
main problems were highlighted: first, the proposals are too complex, especially in 
comparison to the policy landscape in other countries like Germany. Second, participants 
had serious reservations about the proposed structure of the Contracts for Difference 
(CfDs) (See below). 
Some participants thought that it should be possible to fix the problems with the draft Bill 
and believed that stopping the process now was likely to cause even more difficulties. 
Others were less optimistic about the prospects for the Bill, suggesting that at best it could 
be improved but that it would never work especially well. 
Several participants also said that the proposals were based on the assumption that the 
money will be there and that it is just a matter of tapping in to it. They argued that this 
assumption was incorrect and that in fact, there was no evidence that the money will be 
there on the scale that is needed. It was noted that none of the big utilities across the EU are 
making plans to invest at the moment (beyond replacing existing assets) because their 
“balance sheets are broken”. Therefore we are asking them to “go from zero investment to 
massive investment”, which is unlikely to work. 
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Government engagement with the finance community 
“DECC doesn’t listen properly.” 
“It feels like there are different departments with different agendas. It feels 
unwieldy.” 
“From the outside it looks as if the CEO and the Finance Director are disagreeing. 
Who wants to invest against that?” 
Whilst participants observed that there had been quite a lot of discussion with DECC, 
frustration was expressed about the nature of the engagement, per se. One participant 
suggested that their discussions with the Department often seemed to be at cross-purposes, 
while another felt that their conversations did not appear to flow through properly into 
conclusions. 
Another frustration was that there is not enough detail available on the proposals, 
particularly the structure of the CfD. Participants said it was not sufficient for DECC to 
promise more detail at a later date because there was a danger that by passing the Bill now, 
we could lock ourselves into channels that have not been properly thought through and 
which could therefore cause significant problems further down the line. 
Very few of the participants had spoken to the Treasury. There was agreement that 
although it had not really been necessary in the past, the Treasury should now be more 
actively engaging with the investment community. 
There was a perception that communications between government departments was poor 
and that in fact there may be some conflicts between agendas. This situation creates 
uncertainty and risk for investors. 
Making CfDs work 
“The synthetic counterparty must be changed. Access to a CfD must be changed. 
Access to market must be changed.” 
“If it had a government counterparty, it could possibly deliver.” 
“The problem of route to market means this is a Bill for the big boys. […] It won’t 
work for the little people. […] Small generators will be wiped out.”  
“Some risks are binary; if there is no counterparty, we won’t invest.” 
Three big problems with the CfD model were identified: 
• The majority of participants agreed that they had originally been led to believe that the 
CfD would be guaranteed by the State. The shift towards a new “synthetic” 
counterparty model has introduced significant problems. None of the participants 
thought that the model as currently planned would be bankable. This was because there 
was uncertainty about whether it would be legally enforceable and because it was seen 
as being too complex for big investors. 
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• Participants also noted that developers could not be certain that their project would get 
a CfD. It was suggested that there was a balance to be struck between handing contracts 
to anyone who said they wanted to develop a project and only awarding a contract at 
the point of final investment decision. It was suggested that the solution would lie 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
• Route to market is also a concern. It is not clear whether all projects will be able to 
achieve the reference price. One participant suggested that the outcome of the 
proposals as they are currently formulated would be that smaller scale players would be 
squeezed out, leading to greater vertical integration in the market.  
Some participants were not convinced that the CfD model would attract investment and 
argued that ultimately, the State would need to put its balance sheet behind big 
investments. There was also some support for a Regulated Asset Base model as an 
alternative. 
Capacity mechanism 
Although many participants liked the idea of a capacity market in principle, some felt that 
it was difficult to design a mechanism that worked well for anything other than large, 
diversified utilities. 
Political leadership 
“I don’t believe DECC’s figures on the costs to consumers.” 
“The reality is to achieve our climate change and security targets, we have to pay. 
[…] we need to be honest about the cost.” 
“There is a need for political leadership. If government wants investors we need to 
see the government standing behind its decisions and to have a discussion with 
citizens about proposals for energy sector. If the discussion is fair and open we will 
trust their word is true. If not we will put you in the same box as the European 
bailout countries – we won’t believe what you say.” 
Some participants expressed strong concerns about the messages that Government is 
giving to consumers about the likely impact of EMR measures on energy bills. There was 
scepticism about DECC’s published figures on future costs to consumers, although it was 
acknowledged that it is very difficult to predict costs because they depend on commodity 
prices. One participant noted that it was even more difficult to forecast the costs of new 
nuclear because so few have been built in recent years. 
Participants explained that this was a concern for investors because it introduces political 
risk – if consumers are not willing to pay the additional costs for decarbonisation and 
energy security, then Government may be forced to renege on its commitments. Some 
participants highlighted the example of Spain, where a tariff debt accumulated “because 
no-one wanted to tell consumers they had to pay more on their bills”. 
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The future role of gas 
There was some disagreement about whether investment in gas was likely to come forward. 
Some participants believed that the investment case was strong, particularly because Great 
Britain will need peaking plant in the future. Others, however, pointed out that investment 
in gas at the moment is difficult because the spark spread is currently zero. In addition, 
there were concerns that the CfD might crowd out gas in the future and therefore clarity 
was needed about the non-regulated part of the market (i.e. the part not covered by CfD, 
capacity payments or Emissions Performance Standard). 
The future role of renewables 
There was some disagreement about future prospects for the renewables industry. One 
participant noted that share prices in several listed renewables manufacturers had fallen 
dramatically in the last few years. Another noted that some investment funds in London 
were now closing down. However, others did not accept this view, and noted that at a 
global level, investment in renewables was healthy. They suggested that while the current 
economic climate has reduced demand for renewables in Europe at the moment the sector 
is not in inexorable decline. 
There was also disagreement about whether the cost reductions that had been achieved to 
date in technologies like solar PV and onshore wind meant that now was a good time to 
invest in renewables; or whether although moving in the right direction, further cost 
reductions were necessary. 
There was a further disagreement about the impact of renewables on electricity system 
costs. One participant suggested that the additional costs associated with providing backup 
generation for intermittent renewables would lead to higher system costs. However, 
another participant argued that this would only be the case if the mix of generation was 
wrong. In addition, having an optimum mix of generating technologies would take away 
costs associated with the volatility of fossil fuel prices. 
List of participants 
1. Richard Budgett - RCM; analyst covering global utilities 
2. Julian Wolfson - Odey Asset Management - fund manager 
3. Daniel Roberts - Marshal Wace Asset Management; fund manager 
4. Maurizio Carulli – AXA IM – Resources and Utilities Analyst 
5. Graham Taylor - L&G - analyst covering UK utilities 
6. Cornelia Furse - Fidelity International - analyst covering pan Euro utilities 
7. Vantil Charles - Capital International - credit analyst 
8. Verity Mitchell HSBC  
9. Jose Lopez HSBC  
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10. Monica Merli, Moodys 
11. Peter Atherton, Citi  
12. Nick Gardiner, Low Carbon Finance Group 
13. Shaun Kingsbury, Low Carbon Finance Group 
14. Kirsty Hamilton, Low Carbon Finance Group 
15. Ian Temperton, Climate Change Capital 
16. Orlando Finzi M&G Investments 
17. Anne Wade - Capital International - fund manager  
18. Tim Yeo MP 
19. Barry Gardiner MP  
20. Dan Byles MP 
21. John Robertson MP 
22. Laura Sandys MP  
23. Sir Robert Smith MP 
24. Dr Alan Whitehead MP 
25. Albert Owen MP 
26. Dr Robert Gross, Specialist Adviser 
27. Professor Derek Bunn, Specialist Adviser 
28. Sarah Hartwell-Naguib, Clerk 
29. Áine Ni Bhreasail, Committee Specialist 
30. Jenny Bird, Senior Committee Specialist 
31. Sarah Williams, Office of Tim Yeo MP 
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Annex 2: Proposed amendments in 
conventional format for consideration 
during Committee Stage:  
Clause 1, page 1, line 7, after “low carbon electricity generation’, insert ‘in order to achieve 
legally binding carbon budgets at least possible cost to consumers.’ 
Clause 8, page 4, line 30, at end add— 
‘(d) a 2030 target for carbon intensity of the electricity sector compatible with 
meeting statutory carbon budgets and the 2050 target; and 
(e) a reliability standard.’. 
Clause 9, page 4, line 38, at end insert— 
‘(e) the Committee on Climate Change, and’296  
Clause 20, page 13, line 14, after ‘Great Britain’, insert ‘, while achieving legally binding 
carbon budgets at least possible cost to consumers.’ 
Clause 44, page 35, line 40, at end insert— 
‘(d) the Committee on Climate Change.’   
Long title, page 1, leave out from ‘Make’ to ‘for establishing a capacity’ and insert ‘provision 
for support mechanisms and investment instruments in connection with encouraging low 
carbon electricity generation in order to achieve legally binding carbon budgets and 
provide security of supply at least cost to consumers;’. 
 
296 A drafting amendment would also be required to change the existing 9(1) (e) to  9(1)(f) 
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Formal Minutes 
Tuesday 17 July 2012  
Members present: 
Mr Tim Yeo, in the Chair 
Dan Byles  
Barry Gardiner  
Ian Lavery  
Dr Phillip Lee  
Albert Owen 
 
Christopher Pincher
John Robertson 
Laura Sandys 
Sir Robert Smith 
Dr Alan Whitehead 
Sir Robert Smith declared the following interests:  
 
Shareholding in Rio Tinto; mineral extraction and Shell Transport and Trading; oil-integrated. 
 
Mr Tim Yeo declared the following interests:  
 
Director of  ITI Energy Limited; suppliers of gasification equipment; Director AFC Energy; company 
developing alkaline fuel cell technology; Director Eco City Vehicles plc; and Chairman of TMO 
Renewables Limited. Shareholdings in AFC Energy (share option) and Eco City Vehicles plc. 
 
Mr Tim Yeo also declared a non-pecuniary interest as the President of the Renewable Energy Association.  
 
Draft Report (Draft Energy Bill: Pre-legislative Scrutiny), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 237 read and agreed to. 
Annexes and Summary agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of 
Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report (in addition to that 
ordered to be reported for publishing on 24 May, 12, 19 and 26 June, 3 July, and 10 July.) 
 
 
[Adjourned till Tuesday 4 September at 10.00am 
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Finance Group, Shaun Kingsbury, Partner Hudson Clean Energy Partners, on 
behalf of the Low Carbon Finance Group, Gaynor Hartnell, Chief Executive, 
Renewable Energy Association, and Gordon Edge, Director of Policy, Renewable 
UK Ev 35
Tuesday 19 June 2012 (Afternoon) 
Asif Rehmanwala, generation and Trading Director, Ecotricity, Ed Gill, Head of 
External Affairs, Good Energy, Andy Taylor, Energy Markets Group Director, 
InterGen, Gordon MacDougall, Chief Operating Officer, Renewable Energy 
Systems UK and Ireland Ltd, Dr Steve Riley, Chief Executive Officer and President, 
UK-Europe, International Power Plc, and Jonathan Smith, Head of Pricing and Risk 
Management, First Utility Ev 45 
Rhian Kelly, Director of Business Environment, CBI, Richard Hall, Head of Energy 
Regulation, Consumer Focus, Paul Steedman, Senior Campaigner, Friends of the 
Earth, Dustin Benton, Senior Policy Adviser, Green Alliance, and Nick Molho, 
Head of Energy Policy, Climate Change Team, WWF UK Ev 54 
Tuesday 26 June 2012 (Morning) 
Nick Winser, Executive Director, and Mark Ripley, Project Director, Electricity 
Market Reform, National Grid Ev 64 
Tuesday 26 June 2012 (Afternoon) 
Rt Hon Edward Davey MP, Secretary of State, Charles Hendry MP, Minister of 
State, Kathyrn Wood, Bill Team Manager, Jonathan Brearley, Director, and 
Simon Virley, Director General, Energy Markets and Infrastructure, Department of 
Energy and Climate Change Ev 79 
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